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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
December 4, 1981 Conference 




Cert to CAS (Godbold, Simpson, 
Roney) 
v. 
LUCAS (supervisor) Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: The issue is whether petr, a government employee, 
can maintain a "Bivens-type" action against his former supervisor 
based on the supervisor's alleged conspiracy to demote petr in 
violation of his First Amendment rights. 
FACTS: Petr Bush is an aerospace engineer who was for 
several years a civil service employee at NASA's Marshall Space 
Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala. In May and June 1975, Bush 
appeared twice on Huntsville television station WHNT and, in the 
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course of interviews, stated that his position at the Flight 
Center was "a falsehood, travesty and worthless" and that he had 
meaningful work to do only a small percentage of each day. 
Bush's comments were disseminated nationally by the wire services 
and appeared in newspapers in several states. 
On June 25, 1975, resp Lucas, then Director of the Flight 
Center, presided at a press conference in commemoration of the 
Center's 15th anniversary. After the conference was officially 
closed, a WHNT reporter asked Lucas to respond to Bush's charges. 
Lucas replied that 
"I have had [Bush's] statement investigated and I can say 
unequivocally that such a statement has no basis in fact." 
In August 1975, an "adverse personnel action" was instituted 
to remove Bush from his position. Following a hearing, Lucas 
notified Bush that he would not be removed but that he was being 
reduced in grade from GS-14 to GS-12. Bush appealed to the Civil 
Service Commission, which upheld the reduction in grade. 
However, in July 1978 the Commission's Appeals Review Board 
recommended that Bush be reinstated to his former grade and 
awarded $30,724 in back pay; NASA complied with the 
recommendation. 
Meanwhile, Bush had instituted this suit in state court 
alleging that Lucas' statement (quoted above) defamed him and 
that Lucas had conspired to demote him in violation of his First 
Amendment rights. The suit was removed to the N.D. Ala. 
(Pointer) and, in Feb. 1977, the DC granted Lucas' motion for 
summary judgment. The DC concluded first that Lucas was 
absolutely immune from a defamation suit based on statements made 
in his official capacity, see Barr v. Mateo, 360 u.s. 564 (1959)-
- 3 -
-a holding which is not challenged here. The DC then held that 
Bush could not maintain an action for damages against Lucas under 
the First Amendment, because Congress had provided civil service 
employees such as Bush an alternative administrative remedy for 
wrongful demotion. 
On appeal, the CAS affirmed, relying on the then-recent 
decision in Davis v. Passman, 442 u.s. 228 (1979). However, this 
Court vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 446 u.s. 914 (1980). 
HOLDING BELOW: On remand, the same CAS panel reaffirmed the 
DC's grant of summary judgment. Carlson held that the victim of 
a constitutional violation by a federal agent has a right to 
recover damages in a suit against the agent brought directly 
under the Constitution, except when the defendant 1) 
"demonstrate[s] 'special factors counselling hesitation in the 
absence of affirmative action by Congress'"; or 2) "show[s] that 
Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly 
declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and viewed as equally effective." 446 U.S., at 18-
19. The CA did not reach the question whether Congress had 
provided a substitute remedy, since it found that "the unique 
relationship between the Federal Government and its civil service 
employees is a special consideration which counsels hesitation in 
inferring a Bivens remedy in the absence of affirmative 
congressional action." 
The CA first pointed to several cases illustrating that 
"[t] he role of the Government as an employer toward its employees 
is fundamentally different from its role as sovereign over 
private citizens generally." E.g., Sampson v. Murray, 41S U.S. 
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61, 83 (1974); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 u.s. 563 
(1968). This special relationship affects not only the 
substantive rights of public employees but also the manner in 
which an aggrieved employee can seek redress for violations of 
those rights. Through comprehensive legislation and 
administrative regulation, Congress has sought to "achieve a 
proper balance between promoting governmental efficiency and 
protecting the rights of employees aggrieved by improper 
personnel action." It has thus provided for extensive 
administrative review of employee grievances--procedures which 
petr used with success in this case. This case is thus 
distinguishable from Bivens and Carlson, in which private 
citizens sought damages against agents of the government acting 
in its sovereign capacity. Since inferring a "Bivens remedy" in 
this case might encourage employees to bypass their 
congressionally-provided administrative remedies in favor of 
judicial relief, there are "special factors" counselling against 
recognition of a constitutionally-based damages action. See 
Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (CAS 1980). 
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that this Court should grant cert 
to settle the important question whether "a plaintiff's mere 
status as a civilian employee of the United States precludes his 
being accorded a Bivens-type remedy." This issue affects the 3 
million civilian employees of the federal government. (Three 
unions representing government employees have filed amicus briefs 
in support of the petn.) 
Petr also argues that the decision below and Bishop v. Tice, 
supra, conflict with Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 (CA7 1981), 
which held that a federal employee could maintain a damages 
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action based on her allegations of coerced retirement. Indeed, 
the Justice Dept. sought a rehearing in Sonntag by arguing that 
it "conflicts directly" with Bishop and this case. Finally, the 
CAS decision is inconsistent with Carlson. 
The SG responds that the CA correctly determined that the 
special nature of the federal government's relationship with its 
own civil service employees counsels against implication of a 
Bivens remedy here. Accord Bishop v. Tice, supra; Purtill v. 
Harris, 658 F.2d 134, 137-38 (CA3 1981). The CA could also have 
determined that Congress intended its comprehensive civil service 
protections to provide an "equally effective substitute remedy" 
precluding suits by employees against their supervisors brought 
directly under the Constitution. Finally, the decision below 
does not seriously conflict with Sonntag, since that decision was 
predicated on the court's (erroneous) belief that the plaintiff's 
"coerced retirement" claim was irremediable under the civil 
service laws and that therefore she had no alternative remedy 
available. 
DISCUSSION: For the reasons given by the SG, there is not a 
significant conflict with Sonntag. Furthermore, this case is not 
a particularly good vehicle for consideration of the issue 
presented--concededly an important one which the Court may 
eventually want, or be compelled by a direct conflict, to 
address. Petr has already obtained reinstatement and back pay 
pursuant the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission's 
Appeals Board. Thus, even if the case is not technically moot 
(petr makes a vague reference to his "wrongs" not being "full':) 
redressed," and amici refer to punitive damages), it is not 
readily apparent whether anything of importance would hinge on 
- 6 -
the Court's decision. Finally, the CA precedent in the area is 
of recent vintage; it probably would be worthwhile to let that 
precedent develop further before taking the issue. 
However, although neither party mentions the fact, the issue 
in this case is also present in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, No. 79-1738 
and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, No. 80-945, to be argued 11/30/81. 
There, a civil service employee (Fitzgerald) was discharged, 
allegedly in retaliation for his testimony before a congressional 
committee; like Bush, Fitzgerald was reinstated and granted back-
pay by the Civil Service Commission. The primary issue in the 
Fitzgerald cases is the scope of official immunity of a President 
and his advisors; but petrs Harlow and Butterfield, relying in 
:::::::.. 
part on the CAS decision in this case, argue both that "Bivens-
type" actions may not be maintained for First Amendment 
violations and that no constitutionally-based damages remedy 
should be inferred in light of the administrative remedies 
available to Fitzgerald. See Petrs' Brief in No. 80-945, at 21-
25. While these issues are not among the "questions presented" 
in the cert petn (petrs did mention them at 14 n.9 of the cert 
petn in 80-945), it is possible that the Court will discuss them 
in the Fitzgerald opinion. It might therefore be appropriate to 
hold this case for the Fitzgerald cases. Alternatively, I 
recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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No~Bush v. Lucas 
In 197S, while working for NASA, the petitioner 
criticized the management of his branch of the NASA program. 
An adverse personnel action ensued, and petitioner suffered 
a demotion. Following an initial denial of administrative 
relief, petitioner ultimately won reinstatement and back pay 
from the Civil Service Commission. - In the meantllme, 
however, he had i~tituted this dama~es action against 
r~ondent, his admlnistrative super1or. The suit alleged a 
conspfracy to aeprive petitioner of First Amendment rights. 
The district court summarily dismissed the action, and CAS 
affirmed on the ground that Congress had provided an 
al.ternati._y_e remeqy under the ~ivil Service 1\ct. Tliis Court 
then vacated and remandea for reconsioeration in light of 
Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14 (1980). 446 u.s. 914. On the 
remand CAS reaffirmed the decision to grant summary 
judgment. This time it found that "the unique relationship ] 
between the Federal Government and its civil service ~ 
employees is a special consideration which counsels C s--
hesitation in inferring a Bivens remedy in the absence of ~- . 
affirmative congressional act1on.• The panel also noted /~ 
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that inferring a Bivens remedy might encourage employees to 
lA~ bypass congressionally created administrative remedies in 
· ( favor of judicial relief. 
The petitioners in No. 80-94S, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
also argued that the respondent's capacity as a government 
employee represented a •special factor• defeating his claim 
to a Bivens cause of action under the First Amendment. But 
the Court did not reach that issue in Harlow. Nor would the 
circulating opinion in No. 80-1074, Velde v. National Black 
Police Assn., necessarily be dispositive. The four-member 
maJority 1n that case relies on a cumulation of factors not 
all present here. 
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Bush v. Lucas 
Jim January 19, 1983 
I. Questions Presented 
1. Does pltf's status as a civilian employee of the federal 
government preclude a Bivens suit against another federal civilian 
employee personally for deft's violation of pltf's 1st or 5th A 
rights in the course of deft's procuring of pltf's demotion? 
2. Does administrative relief with respect to such demotion 
preempt a Bivens suit by the demoted federal civilian employee 
against the individual person who, while purporting to act in his 
official executive position with the federal government, allegedly 
conspired with others to procure the demotion in retaliation for the 
pltf's public comments upon personnel and management practices at 




Petr is an employee of NASA at the Marshall Space Flight 
Center. The Center's management assigned petr to a new position. 
Petr voiced objections to the assignment, stating that the position 
lacked any duties of consequence. He appealed the reassignment to 
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and, during the pendency of the 
appeal, spoke out concerning the lack of productive work in the new 
position and the apparent misuse and waste of federal funds. 
After the media reported petr's views, resp, the Director of 
the Center, stated during a press conference that he had ordered an 
investigation of petr's statements and that they had no basis in 
fact. Less than two months later, a personnel action was initiated 
against petr. Resp, charged with decisionmaking authority in such 
matters, reduced petr in grade from GS-14 to GS-12. Petr appealed 
....._ _____......_ ~ 7 
this decision to the esc, and was ultimately restored to his former 
grade and awarded back pay. 
Before he received this favorable decision, petr filed suit in 
state court, alleging that resp had conspired with others to demote 
petr in retaliation for the exercise of his lst A rights. Resp 
removed the case to DC and moved for SJ. The DC granted the motion 
and the CA affirmed. Petr then filed a petn for cert, which the 
Court GVRed in light of Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14 (1980). 
B. Decision Below 
/ 
On remand, the CAS again affirmed the DC's decision. The court 
~
stated that it would not confer on petr a damages remedy implied 




counselling hesitation" in finding such a remedy, and it ruled that 
such factors are present here. Specifically, the CAS found "the 
unique relationship between the Federal Government and its civil 
service employees" to be such a special factor • 
...::....---
III. Summary of the Parties' Contentions 
A. Petr 
The status of a Bivens plaintiff as a civilian employee of the 
federal government is not sufficient to constitute a "special factor 
counseling hesitation" in the according of the Bivens remedy to such 
plaintiff. Rather, the interest of the Government as employer is 
one of several interests to be balanced in determining which of 
several interests is to be prevail. Petr's status as an employee of 
the Government does not deprive him altogether of his rights to 
express himself publicly on matters of public concern or to petn the 
Government for redress of grievances. 
Congress's creation of a civil service system, although 
------------------------------------certainly attended by efforts to preserve some balance between the 
rights of governmental employees as citizens and the interest of the 
Government as employer, does not evidence incompatibility between 
the maintenance of the efficient public service and the vindication 
of the employees' 1st A rights by a Bivens suit. Administrative 
relief is not sufficiently comprehensive or focused to warrant an 
inference that Congress meant for the statutes and regulations to be 
the exclusive remedy for a civilian employee who had suffered a 
retaliatory deomotion in reprisal for his having exercised his 1st A 
rights. Moreover, such an inference, even had it been warranted, 
4. 
would not have constituted an explicit congressional declaration 
that the statutes were to be a substitute for a Bivens suit. 
B. SG 
In Bivens, the Court held that a plaintiff who alleges that his 
constitutional rights have been violated may sue the responsible 
federal officials for damages, even though Congress has not 
explicitly established such a remedy. In each case in which the 
Court has allowed a Bivens action, however, it has ensured that it 
was not acting in a fashion inconsistent with Congress's intent. In 
particular, the Court has allowed a Bivens action only after 
concluding either that Congress has not addressed the question how 
to remedy a particular category of constitutional violations, or 
that Congress has resolved that question in a way that presupposes a 
judicially created damages remedy. 
In this respect, Bivens and its progeny are faithful to the 
principle--wel r ,established in other areas where federal courts have 
acted in the absence of explicit congressional authority--that, when -
1 
Congress addresses a remedial problem in a way that reflects its 
intention to occupy the field, that intention must be honored. 
Bivens recognized this principle by stating that an alternative 
remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress, precludes an 
implied personal damages action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 u.s. 388, 397 (1971). 
Moreover, Bivens expressly acknowledged that in some contexts--where 
there are "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress"--a court should not afford a 
5. 
traditional judicial remedy even if Congress has not specifically 
addressed the remedial problem. 
The civil service remedies that were available to petr, and 
that he successfully invoked, not only were fully adequate to 
redress a constitutional violation, but reflected Congress's intent 
to occupy the field in a way that precludes a judicially created 
Bivens remedy. Moreover, special factors arising from the federal 
employment relationship require, at a minimum, that any doubts be 
resolved in favor of the preclusive effect of the civil service 
remedies. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Case Law 
~ 
In Carlson, the Court summarized the principles that govern the 
availability of a damages remedy in federal court against a federal 
official when a violation of constitutional rights is alleged: 
Bivens established that the victims of a 
constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right 
to recover damages against the official in federal court 
depite the absence of any statute conferring such a right. 
Such a cause of action may be defeated in a particular 
case, however, in two situations. The Lirst is when 
defendants demonstrate "special factors counselling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress." 403 U.S., at 396; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 
228, 245 (1979). The ~ecojld is when defendants show that 
Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it 
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery 
directly under the Constitut1on and v1ewed as equally 
effective. Bivens, supra, at 397; Davis v. Passman, 
supra, at 245-247. 
~ ? ~ 446 U.S., at 18-19. 
~. finding that "[t]he foregoing statement contains dicta that go well 
JUSTICE POWELL concurred in the judgment, 
.. t! beyond the prior holdings of this Court." Id., at 26. He indicated that federal courts have much more "discretion" in determining 
~ 
~~ 
whether a remedy should be inferred from the Constitution than the 
majority in Carlson allowed. Id., at 28-29. 
In Davis, JUSTICE POWELL dissented, stating "that federal 
courts must exercise a principled discretion when called upon to 
infer a private cause of action directly from the language of the 
Constitution." 442 U.S., at 252. He emphasized that one of the 
6. 
"policies that a court certainly should consider in deciding whether 
to imply a constitutional right of action is that of comity toward 
an equal and coordinate branch of government." Id., at 253. Any 
less consideration and balancing, he said, "avoids our obligation to 
take into account the range of policy and constitutional 
considerations that we would expect a legislature to ponder in 
determining whether a particular remedy should be enacted." Id., at 
255. 
B. "Special Factors" 
It seems clear that the traditional remedy of damages for 
constitutional violations is not to be defeated simply because there 
is a countervailing government interest. The Court has apparently 
reserved "special factors" for extraordinary cases, where the mere 
threat of litigation and personal accountability would impinge upon 
the constitutional prerogatives of officials in coordinate branches 
of government. 
I • \I 
The actual examples of "special factors," however, are few. 
Bivens opinion discussed only two circumstances, both very 
unique: (i} cases involving "federal fiscal policy," where the U.S. 
was a plaintiff, such as United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301 





employee for nonconstitutional claims, such as Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 
373 U.S. 647 (1963). See Bivens, 403 U.S., at 396-397. A third 
"special factor counseling hestitation" was recognized in Davis, 
where this Court stated that employment discrimination by a 
Congressman raised "special concerns counselling hestitation" 
because of deft's status as a Congressman. 442 u.s., at 246. Such 
concerns were nevertheless held not to preclude a Bivens remedy 
because they were accommodated by the coextensive protections of the 
Speech or Debate Clause. 
Davis did not concern the Government in its role as a sovereign 
over private citizens generally, but the role of the Government as 
an employer toward its employees. Yet the Court saw nothing about 
the employment relationship as such to suggest that courts should 
withhold a cause of action in damages. In Carlson, the Court 
determined that a pltf's prisoner status does not preclude a Bivens 
claim, indicating that the Court had no intention of authorizing a 
freewheeling inquiry into whether pltf's relationship to the 
Government is a "special factor counselling hesitation." Moreover, 
the Court expressly held that, even where the defense of a Bivens 
action would inhibit the performance of official duties by deft 
officers, this is not a "special factor" sufficient to preclude a 
Bivens remedy. See 446 u.s., at 19. 
Davis hardly suggests a cautious judicial approacg here. If 
anything, the relationship between a member of Congress and his 
small staff is likely to be considerably more intimate than that 
which exists between the chief policy makers and lower level 
employees in the executive branch. Few employers enjoy more 
discretion than congressional members. 
The CAS focused on three factors that indicated the federal 
employer/employee relationship was not to be policed by Bivens 
actions~ivil service remedies~he high _degree of congressional 
oversight ~ontrol that characterizes the employer-employee 
relationship in federal service, and t~ircumscribed nature of 
governmental employees' grievance rights. These are not, however, 
of the same importance or character as the factors recognized as 
special in prior Court opinions. First, the difficulty with 
remedies as a special factor is that it reviews congressional 
enactments under an inappropriate portion of the Carlson test, 
rendering superfluous one branch of the test. Second, it would be 
anomalous to subject members of Congress to potential liability 
under Bivens arising out of an employment relationship, and almost 
8. 
employers under §1983, but exempt all federal supervisory 
~~ ... ~loyees in the Executive branch simply because they are federal 
l employees. See Carlson, 446 u.s., at 22 ("' [T]he constitutional 
~~ design' would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face 
~- at least the same liability as state officials guilty of the same 
~ constitutional transgression."); Butz v. Economou, 438 u.s., at 501 
("Surely, federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of 
protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do 
state officers.") (emphasis in original). And finally, the Court's 
decisions, in a wide variety of settings, make clear that 1st A 
rights are subject to balancing of interests, and the balancing 
analysis used in employee cases such as Pickering is no different in 
} 
9 0 
principle from that called for by the Court in other 1st A cases. 
Thus, the fact that the speech of federal emloyees is subject to a 
weighing of competing interests does not seem particularly 
"special." 
I find it difficult to conclude that the federal 
employee/employer relationship, standing alone, should constitute a 
"special factor," as the Court used that phrase in Carlson. 
C. Alternative Remedies 
The Government argues that there is a statutory scheme that 
fulfills the second part of the Carlson test and preempts the Bivens 
action that would otherwise be available to petr. The scheme is 
said to emerge from various provisions of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, 
as amended and the Back Pay Act of 1966. The Government finds 
additional support for its position in the Civil Service Reform Act 
of 1978. 
The CAS did not rely expressly on this portion of the Carlson 
test, but I find it difficult to conclude that the Government has 
carried its Carlson burden of demonstrating that Congress "provided 
an alternative remedy which is expliitly declared to be a substitute 
for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective." 446 U.S., at 18-19 (emphasis in original). The 
J ~.n~remedial scheme on which the Government relies is much different 
~~ 0 
from a Bivens action: the statutes do not provide for compensatory 
d h h b k ~f -- . . d ($Jf . amages ot er t an ac pay, or pun1t1ve amages, or or Jury 
trial. Most important, the Carlson standard requires a subjective 
determination of congressional intent, and there is nothing in the 




remedy or create an equally effective remedy for constitutional 
violations. 
D. Difficulties with a Bivens Action 
Despite my inability to conclude that the Carlson standard 
precludes a cause of action in this case, I have trouble believing 
that such an action is desirable, largely for the reasons stated by 
the SG in his brief. Even if the federal relationship is not a 
special factor consistent with the few precendents in this area, it 
remains "special" in many ways. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 u.s. 134, 
168 (1974)~inion of POWELL, J.), you emphasized that, "to perform 
its resposibilities effectively and economically, .•• the 
Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control 
over the management of its personnel and internal affairs." It is 
naive to suggest that an implied cause of action running against an 
agency head's personal assets will not influence how some executive 
officers conduct government business. Because Government business 
is a concern of all citizens, the Government interest here is 
somewhat special. 
It is impossible to overlook the incredibly comprehensive--and 
employee-protective--remedial civil service scheme, the existence 
alone of which counsels strongly for not giving petr another remedy. 
Under 5 u.s.c. §7513(a), petr could be demoted "only for such cause 
as will promote the efficiency of [the civil] service." This 
standard prohibits adverse actions that violate the 1st A. See 
Arnett, 416 U.S., at 162 {opinion of JUSTICE REHNQUIST). It is very 
difficult for resp to argue that federal workers need much more 
I ! 
11. 
protection or that their supervisors need to be deterred further, 
regardless of the wrong. 
It should not be lost sight that what the Court has before it 
is simply federal common law, and the fact that the implied cause of 
action at issue here is for a constitutional harm is irrelevant. 
The Court's trend of not implying remedies with statutory violations 
is inconsistent with its approach in Carlson of providing many 
implied Bivens actions for any constitutional violation. The Court 
has undercut the sweep of .carlson greatly by importing immunities 
from other areas, but the bottom line has to be that, as far as 
judicially created remedies are concerned, "there is not a damages 
remedy for every legal wrong." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 
2704 n. 37 {1982) {POWELL, J.). If ever there were pltfs or wrongs 
that do not need a damages remedy, this would seem to be the case. 
The Court may have suggested as much in Nixon when it took notice 
that "it was clear at least that Fitgerald was entitled to seek a 
remedy before the Civil Service Commission--a remedy of which he 
availed himself." Id., at 2705 n. 37. See also Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2740 n.36 {1982) {quoting and citing 
this case, and viewing question presented here as not 
"insubstantial"). 
Assuming, as we must, that Bivens will remain the law, a more --
appropriate test than that of Carlson for determining when a Bivens 
action will be implied is, as a threshold question, whether an - -
' i mplied cause of action~ is inconsistent with congressional intent as 
expressed elsewhere--here by the remedial scheme that Congress did 
------------~ 
provide. This standard would be more consistent with the other 
12. 
implied-right-of-action cases. Here, the answer is not too 
difficult. Congress has specifically addressed the question what 
remedy to afford a civil servant who complains of an unlawful 
personnel action. Congress has established an elaborate and 
integrated remedial scheme, consisting of multiple levels of 
administrative consideration followed by judicial review. These 
remedies are designed to provide adequate compensation to any 
federal employee who is the victim of an unconstitutional personnel 
action. By providing for judicial reciew and such compensatory 
relief, these civil service remedies exceed any minimum requirements 
of adequacy derived from the Constitution itself. 
V. Summary 
It is difficult after Carlson to say that current standards do 
not give petr a private right of action for damages. But I find 
nothing in the policies behind creating implied causes of action 
that supports finding one here. I think the restrictive Carlson 
standard should be modified to parallel more closely the Court's 
standard with regard to implied causes of action in other contexts, 
with an emphasis on congressional intent. The fact that a Bivens 
l~ remedy involves constitutional rights does not alter the basic nature of the inquiry, which is whether allowing that remedy ~s 
consistent with Congress's intent. Of course, the inquiry into 
congressional intent necessarily takes into account every relevant 
factor, see Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 825 {1976)--including the 
importance of the rights involved--but the question whether the 
courts should create a particular remedy should turn on whether 
Congress intended to occupy the field. I recommend affirming. 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-469 
WILLIAM C. BUSH, PETITIONER v. 
WILLIAM R. LUCAS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1983] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner asks us to authorize a new nonstatutory dam-
ages remedy for federal employees whose First Amendment 
rights are violated by their superiors. Because such claims 
arise out of an employment relationship that is governed by 
comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving 
meaningful remedies against the United States, we conclude 
that it would be inappropriate for us to supplement that regu-
latory scheme with a new judicial remedy. 
Petitioner Bush is an aerospace engineer employed at the 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, a major facility op-
erated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion in Alabama. Respondent Lucas is the Director of the 
Center. In 1974 the facility was reorganized and petitioner 
was twice reassigned to new positions. He objected to both 
reassignments and sought formal review by the Civil Service 
Commission. 1 In May and June 1975, while some of his ad-
ministrative appeals were pending, he made a number of 
public statements, including two televised interviews, that 
' The record indicates that petitioner filed two appeals from the first re-
assignment and three appeals from the second. App. to Pet. for Writ of 
Cert. e-3 to e-4. He asserts that he had previously made unsuccessful at-
tempts within the Center to obtain redress. App. 30. 
.. 
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were highly critical of the agency. The news media quoted 
him as saying that he did not have enough meaningful work 
to keep him busy, that his job was "a travesty and worth-
less," and that the taxpayers' money was being spent fraudu-
lently and wastefully at the Center. His statements were 
reported on local television, in the local newspaper, and in a 
national press release that appeared in newspapers in at least 
three other States. 2 
In June 1975 respondent, in response to a reporter's in-
quiry, stated that he had conducted an investigation and that 
petitioner's statements regarding his job had "no basis in 
fact." App. 15. In August 1975 an adverse personnel ac-
tion was initiated to remove petitioner from his position. 
Petitioner was charged with "publicly mak[ing] intemperate 
remarks which were misleading and often false, evidencing a 
malicious attitude towards Management and generating an 
environment of sensationalism demeaning to the Govern-
ment, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and the personnel of the George C. Marshall Space Flight 
Center, thereby impeding Government efficiency and econ-
omy and adversely affecting public confidence in the Govern-
ment service." He was also informed that his conduct had 
undermined morale at the Center and caused disharmony and 
disaffection among his fellow employees. 3 Petitioner had 
the opportunity to file a written response and to make an oral 
presentation to agency officials. Respondent then deter-
mined that petitioner's statements were false and misleading 
and that his conduct would justify removal, but that the 
lesser penalty of demotion was appropriate for a "first of-
fense." App. 15. He approved a reduction in grade from 
GS-14 to GS-12, which decreased petitioner's annual salary 
by approximately $9,716. 
2 App. to Pet. for Cert. d-2 to d-3 (memorandum opinion of District 
Court); id., at e-19 (opinion of Federal Employee Appeals Authority). 
' !d., at f-2 to f-3, e-19, e-7. 
81--469-0PINION 
BUSH v. LUCAS 3 
Petitioner exercised his right to appeal to the Federal Em-
ployee Appeals Authority. After a three-day pubhc fiear-
i~ upheld some of the charges and concluded 
that the demotion was justified. It specifically determined 
that a number of petitioner's public statements were mislead-
ing and that, for three reasons, they "exceeded the bounds of 
expression protected by the First Amendment." First, peti-
tioner's statements did not stem from public interest, but 
from his desire to have his position abolished so that he could 
take early retirement and go to law school. Second, the 
statements conveyed the erroneous impression that the 
agency was deliberately wasting public funds, thus discredit-
ing the agency and its employees. Third, there was no le-
gitimate public interest to be served by abolishing petition-
er's position. 4 
Two years after the Appeals Authority's decision, peti-
tioner requested the Civil Service Commission's Appeals Re-
view Board to reopen tilePfoceeding. Ti;; Board reexam-
ined petitioner's First Amendment claim and, after making a 
detailed review of the record and the applicable authorities, 
applied the balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board 
of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). On the one hand, it ac-
knowledged the evidence tending to show that petitioner's 
motive might have been personal gain, and the evidence that 
his statements caused some disruption of the agency's day-to-
day routine. On the other hand, it noted that society as well 
as the individual had an interest in free speech, including "a 
right to disclosure of information about how tax dollars are 
spent and about the functioning of government apparatus, an 
interest in the promotion of the efficiency of the government, 
and in the maintenance of an atmosphere of freedom of ex-
pression by the scientists and engineers who are responsible 
' I d., at e-38 to e-39. Petitioner could have obtained judicial review of 
the Authority's determination by filing suit in a federal district court or in 
the U. S. Court of Claims, but did not do so. 
f 
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for the planning and implementation of the nation's space 
program." Because petitioner's statements, though some-
what exaggerated, "were not wholly without truth, they 
properly stimulated public debate." Thus the nature and ex-
tent of proven disruption to the agency's operations did not 
"justify abrogation of the exercise of free speech." 5 The 
Board recommended that petitioner be restored to his former 
position, retroactively to November 30, 1975, and that he re-
ceive back pay. That recommendation was accepted. Peti-
tioner received approximately$ 30,000 in back pay. 
While his administrative a eal w e · petitioner 
filed an action a amst res ondent in tate court n A!aOama 
see ng to recover damages for defamatiOn and violation of 
his constitutional rights. Respondent removed the lawsuit 
to the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Alabama, which granted respondent's motion for summary 
judgment. It held, first, that the defamation claim could not 
be maintained because, under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
(1959), respondent was absolutely munune from liability for 
damages for defamation; and second, that petitioner's demo-
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~. 
action could be maintained. 6 The United States Court of (_ J) A~~ 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 598 F. 2d 958 (1979). £;" - f V 
We vacated that court's judgment, 446 U. S. 914 (1980), and . ~-~ _ ~ ~I 
directed that it reconsider the case in the light of our inter- W ..t... 
vening decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). t- . . LI ~.~J 
The Court of Appeals again affirmed the judgment against ~~~ 
petitioner. It adhered to its previous conclusion "that plain- ~ L~ v 
tiff had no cause of action for damages under the First 
Amendment for retaliatory demotion in view of the available ~~~ 
remedies under the Civil Service Commission regulations." --;r:.::::...._ -
647 F. 2d 573, 574 (1981). It explained that the relationship 
between the Federal Government and its civil service em-
5 I d., at f-23 to f-25. 
6 Id., at d-2 to d-17. 
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ployees was a special factor counselling against the judicial 
recognition of a damages remedy under the Constitution in 
this context. 
Vje assu:gJ.e for purposes of decision that petitioner's First 
Amendment rights were violated by the adverse personnel 
action. 7 W ~ also assume that, as petitioner asserts, civil 
service rem~di~ere not as effective as an individual dam-
ages remedy 8 and did not fully compensate him for the harm 
he suffered. 9 Two further propositions are undisputed. 
Congress has not expressly authorized the damages remedy 
that petitioner asks us to provide. On the other hand, Con-
gress has not expressly precluded the creation of such a rem-
edy by declaring that existing statutes provide the exclusive 
mode of redress. 
Thus, we assume, a federal right ha.§. been violated and 
Congress ~vided a less than complete remedy for the 
wrong. If we were writing on a clean slate, we might an-
swer the question whether to supplement the statutory 
7 Competent decisionmakers may reasonably disagree about the merits 
of petitioner's First Amendment claim. Compare the opinion of the Dis-
trict Court, App. D to Pet. for Writ of Cert., and the opinion of the Atlanta 
Field Office of the Federal Employees Appeal Authority issued on August 
12, 1976, App. E, both rejecting petitioner's claims, with the opinion of the 
Appeals Review Board issued on July 14, 1978, App. F, finding that the 
First Amendment had been violated. This question is not before us. 
8 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 20-23 (1980) (factors making Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act recovery less "effective" than an action under the 
Constitution to recover damages against the individual official). Peti-
tioner contends that, unlike a damages remedy against respondent individ-
ually, civil service remedies against the Government do not provide for pu-
nitive damages or a jury trial and do not adequately deter the 
unconstitutional exercise of authority by supervisors. Brief for Petitioner 
27-29. 
9 His attorney's fees were not paid by the Government, and he claims to 
have suffered uncompensated emotional and dignitary harms. Id., at 
24-26. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not need to decide 
whether such costs could be recovered as compensation in an action 
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scheme in either of two quite simple ways. We might adopt 
the common-law approach to the judicial recognition of new 
causes of action and hold that it is the province of the judi-
ciary to fashion an adequate remedy for every wrong that can 
be proved in a case over which a court has jurisdiction. 10 Or ) 
we might start from the premise that federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction whose remedial powers do not 
e~teno beyona ffie grantin-ofre~zed by 
Congre s. naer t e former approac , pe 1 1oner would 
ooviously prevail; under the latter, it would be equally clear 
that he would lose. 
Our prior...,£ases, although sometimes emphasizing one ap-
proach and sometimes the other, have unequivocally rejected 
b_2.th ~· They establish ~ur power to grant rehef 
tn:ifiS-not expressly authorized by statute, but they also re-
mind us that such power is to be exercised in the light of rele-
vant policy determinations made by the Congress. We 
therefore first review some of the cases establishin_g __ our 
power fo remed violat10nSOffiieCOn8titutiOnanatl1en con-
sider the oeanng o e ex1stmg sta utory scheme on the pre-
cise issue presented by this case. 
I 
The federal courts' power to grant relief not expressly au-
thorized by Congress is firmly established. Under 28 
U. S. C. § 1331 (1976), the federal courts have jurisdiction to 
10 In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803), Chief Justice 
Marshall invoked the authority of Blackstone's Commentaries in support of 
this proposition. Blackstone had written, "it is a general and indisputable 
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, 
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded .... it is a settled and in-
variable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, 
must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." 3 Commentar-
ies 23, 109. 
"See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 428 
(1971) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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decide all cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States." This jurisdictional grant pro-
vides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of ac-
tion is stated by a plaintiffs claim that he has been injured by 
a violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. 8. 678, 
684 (1946), but also the authority to choose among available 
judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights. 
This Court has fashioned a wide variety of nonstatutory rem-
edies for vwlatwns of t e on · · an s ate 
o'fficials. 12 The cases most relevant to the problem before us 
are those in which the Court has held that the Constitution 
itself supports a priv cause of action for damages against a 
federal official. Biven · v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U. 8. (1971); Davis v.~442 U. 8. 
228 (1979); ~ v. Green, 446 U. 8. 80). 
In Bivens tne-pfaintiff alleged that federal agents, without 
a warrant or probable cause, had arrested him and searched 
his home in a manner causing him great humiliation, embar-
rassment, and mental suffering. He claimed damages on the 
theory that the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment 
provided an independent basis for relief. The Court upheld 
the sufficiency of his complaint, rejecting the argument that a 
state tort action in trespass provided the only appropriate ju-
12 See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (ejectment action 
against federal officers to enforce Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment); 
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 64-65 (1900) (damages against state officer 
for denying plaintiffs right to vote in federal election); Ex parte Young, 
209 U. S. 123 (1908) (injunctive relief against state official for violation of 
Fourteenth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398 
(1914) (exclusion in federal criminal case of evidence seized in violation of 
Fourth Amendment); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933) 
(award of interest as well as principal in just compensation claim founded 
on the Fifth Amendment); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educa-
tion, 402 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (school busing to remedy unconstitutional 
racial segregation). See generally Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 
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dicial remedy. The Court explained why the absence of a 
federal statutory basis for the cause of action was not an ob-
stacle to the award of damages: 
"That damages may be obtained for injuries conse-
quent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by fed-
eral officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition. 
Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordi-
nary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib-
erty. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon 
v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927); Swafford v. 
Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 
U. S. 58 (1900); J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and 
the Supreme Court 28 et seq. (1966); N. Lasson, History 
and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 43 et seq. (1937); Katz, The 
Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and 
the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 
8-33 (1968); cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894); 
Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17 (1884). Of course, 
the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words pro-
vide for its enforcement by an award of money damages 
for the consequences of its violation. But 'it is . . . well 
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a 
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for 
such invasion, federal courts may use any available rem-
edy to make good the wrong done.' Bell v. Hood, 327 
U. S., at 684 (footnote omitted). The present case in-
volves no special factors counselling hesitation in the ab-
sence of affirmative action by Congress. We are not 
dealing with a question of 'federal fiscal policy,' as in 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311 
(1947)." 403 U. S., at 395-396. 
The Court further noted that there was "no explicit congres-
sional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's 
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money 
81-469-0PINION 
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damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to 
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress." 
Id., at 397. 
In his separate concurring opinion, ~an also 
thought it clear that the power to authorize damages as a 
remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional right 
had not been placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in 
Congress' hands. ld., at 401-402. Instead, he reasoned, 
the real guestion presented was not "whether the federal 
coUrts have the power to afford one type of remedy as op-
posed to the other, but rather to the criteria which should 
govern the exercise of our power." !d., at 406. In resolv-
ing that question he suggested "that the range of policy con-
s\_derations we may take into account is ar least as broad as 
the range of those a legislature would consider with respect 
to an expressed statutory authorization of a traditional rem-
edy." Id., at 407. After weighing the relevant policies he 
agreed with the Court's conclusion that the Government had 
not advanced any substantial policy consideration against 
recognizing a federal cause of action for violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights by federal officials. 
In avts v. Passman 442 U. S. 228 (1979), the petitioner, 
former eputy admm1s rative assistant to a Member of Con-
gress, alleged that she had been discharged because of her 
sex, in violation of her constitutional right to the equal pro-
tection of the laws. We held that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment gave her a federal constitutional right 
to be free from official discrimination and that she had alleged 
a federal cause of action. In reaching the conclusion that an 
award of damages would be an appropriate remedy, we em-
p as· he fact that no other alternative form of ·udicial re-
lief was availa le. Not only was the case one in w 1ch "it is 
13 "Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see n. 1, 
supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would be unavailing. 
And there are available no other alternative forms of judicial relief. For 
81-46~0PINION 
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damages or nothing"; we also were persuaded that the special 
concerns which would ordinarily militate against allowing re-
covery from a legislator were fully reflected in respondent's 
affirmative defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause of 
the Constitution. I d., at 246. We noted the absence of any 
explicit congressional declaration that persons in petitioner's 
position may not recover damages from those responsible for 
their in'ur . ld., at 246-247. 
arlson v. Gr- 446 U. S. 14 (1980), involved a claim 
that a fe era prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights had been 
violated. The prisoner's mother brought suit on behalf of 
her son's estate, alleging that federal prison officials were re-
sponsible for his death because they had violated their con-
stitutional duty to provide him with proper medical care after 
he suffered a severe asthmatic attack. Unlike Bivens and 
Davis, the Green case was one in which Coniress had pro-
~d a remedy, under the :Federal."'T''rf"Craims Act, agrunst 
the Unitea"'Stafes for the alleged wrong. 28 U. S. C. § 2671 
et seq. (1976). As is true in this case, that remedy was not as 
completely effective as a Bivens-type action based directly on 
the Constitution. 
The Court acknowledged that a Bivens action could be de-
feated in two situations, but found that neither was present. 
First, the Court could discern "no special factors counselling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." 
446 U. S., at 18--19, citing Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396, and Da-
vis, 442 U. S., at 245. Second, there was no congressional 
determination foreclosing the damages claim and making the 
Federal Tort Claims Ac\ ,exclusive. 446 U. S., at 19, and n. 
5. No Ytatute expressly decl~red the FTCA r.5!~ be a 
substitute for a Bwens"" action;Triaeeo, tne legislative history 
~ . 
of the 1974 amendments to the FTCA "made 1t crystal clear 
that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, comple-




Davis, as for Bivens, 'it is damages or nothing.' Bivens, supra, at 410 ~  ~ 
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)." 442 U. S., at 245. 
~ 
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This much is clearly established by our prior cases. The 
federal courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal ques-
tions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim 
of a constitutional violation. As long as it provides a s_on-
stitutionally adequate if not id 'ca alternative remedy, 
Co~s its intent, by statutory language or 
clear legis a 1ve 1s ory, that such po wer shoul<i.not be ex_er-
cised. l\1oreover, '6y creating an equally effective remedy, 
COrigress may eliminate the need for judicial recognition of a 
Bivens-type action for damages. In the absence of either of 
these circumstances, the federal courts must make the kind 
of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-
law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special 
factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind 
of federal litigation. 
Congress has not resolved the question presented by this 
case, either by expressly denying petitioner the judicial rem-
edy he seeks or by providing him with an equally effective 
substitute. 14 We must therefore consider whether a federal 
employee's attempt to recover dama es from fiTs superior for 
v1o ation o 1s irst men ment rights involves a,ny "special 
factors counselling hesitation." When those wordswere 
first usea in Hwens, 4Us-u. 8., at 396, w~ illustrated our 
meaning by referring to United States v. Standard Oil Co., 
332 U. S. 301, 311, 316 (1947), and United States v. Gilman, 
347 u. s. 507 (1954). 
In the Standard Oil case the Court had been asked to au-
thorize a new damages remedy for the Government against a 
tortfeasor who had injured a soldier, imposing hospital ex-
penses on the Government and depriving it of his services. 
14 We need not reach the question whether the Constitution itself re-
quires a judicially-fashioned damages remedy in the absence of any other 
remedy to vindicate the underlying right, unless there is an express 
textual command to the contrary. Cf. Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246. 
The existing civil service remedies for a demotion in retaliation for pro-
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Although, as Justice Jackson properly noted in dissent, the 
allowance of recovery would not have involved any usurpa-
tion of legislative power, 332 U. S., at 318, the Court never-
theless concluded that Congress as "the custodian of the na-
tional purse" should make the necessary determination of 
federal fiscal policy. 15 The Court refused to create a dam-
ages remedy, which would be "the instrument for determin-
ing and establishing the federal fiscal and regulatory policies 
which the Government's executive arm thinks should prevail 
in a situation not covered by traditionally established liabil-
ities." Id., at 314. 
Similarly, in Gilman, the Court applied the Standard Oil 
rationale to reject the Government's attempt to recover in-
demnity from one of its employees after having been held lia-
ble under the FTCA for the employee's negligence. As the 
Court noted, "The relations between the United States and 
its employees have presented a myriad of problems with 
which the Congress over the years has dealt. . . . Govern-
ment employment gives rise to policy questions of great im-
port, both to the employees and to the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches." 374 U. S., at 509. The decision 
regarding indemnity involved questions of employee disci-
pline and morale, fiscal policy, and the efficiency of the fed-
eral service. Hence, the Court wrote, the reasons for defer-
'
5 "Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into law is a proper 
subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours. Con-
gress, not this Court or the other federal courts, is the custodian of the 
national purse. By the same token it is the primary and most often the 
exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend, as we 
have said, securing the treasury or the government against financial losses 
however inflicted, including requiring reimbursement for injuries creating 
them, as well as filling the treasury itself." 332 U. S., at 314--315. 
The Court further noted that the type of harm for which the Executive 
sought judicial redress was not new, and that Congress presumably knew 
of it but had not exercised its undoubted power to authorize a damages ac-
tion. Id., at 315--316. 
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ring to Congressional policy determinations were even more 
compelling than in Standard Oil. 
"Here a complex of relations between federal agencies 
and their staffs is involved. Moreover, the claim now 
asserted, though the product of a law Congress passed, 
is a matter on which Congress has not taken a position. 
It presents questions of policy on which Congress has 
not spoken. The selection of that policy which is most 
advantageous to the whole involves a host of consider-
ations that must be weighed and appraised. That func-
tion is more appropriately for those who write the laws, 
rather than for those who interpret them." I d., at 
511-513. 
The special factors counselling hesitation in the creation of 
a new remedy in Standard Oil and Gilman did not concern 
the merits of the particular remedy that was sought. 
Rather, they related to th uestion of who should decide 
whether such a remedy should be rov1 e . e should ~ ~ 
there ore begin by consi ering whether there are reasons for ~/ 
allowing Congress to prescribe the scope of relief that is . T" .... 
made available to federal employees whose First Amendment ~
rights have been violated by their supervisors. /'~ ... ~.J~.A.f, c/e> 
II ._.~_,_., 
Unlike Standard Oil and Gilman, this case concerns a
claim that a constitutional right has been violated. Never-~ 
theless, just as those cases involved "federal fiscal policy" 
and the relations between the Government and its employ-
ees, the ultimate question on the merits in this case may ap-
propriately be characterized as one of "federal personnel pol-
icy." When a federal civil servant is the victim of a 
retaliatory demotion or discharge because he has exercised 
his First Amendment rights, what legal remedies are avail-
able to him? 
The answer to that question has changed dramatically over 
{ I 
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the years. Originally the answer was entirely a matter of 
Executive discretion. During the era of the patronage 
system that prevailed in the federal government prior to the 
enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883, 22 Stat. 403, the fed-
eral employee had no legal protection against political retalia-
tion. Indeed, the exercise of the First Amendment right to 
support a political candidate opposing the party in office 
would routinely have provided an accepted basis for dis-
charge.16 During the past century, however, the job secu-
rity of federal employees has steadi13, iJtcreased. 
In the Pendleton Act Congressletlat>ed the Civil Service 
Commission and provided for the selection of federal civil ser-
vants on a merit basis by competitive examination. Al-
though the statute did not address the question of removals 
in general, 17 it provided that no employee in the public service 
could be required to contribute to arty political fund or fired 
for refusing to do so, and it prohibited officers from attempt-
ing to influence or coerce the political actions of others. 18 
16 The Report of the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment sub-
mitted by Senator Pendleton on May 15, 1882, contained a vivid description 
of the patronage system, reading in part as follows: 
"The fact is confessed by all observers and commended by some that 'to the 
victors belong the spoils;' that with each new administration comes the 
business of distributing patronage among its friends. . . . [The President] 
is to do what some predecessor of his has left undone, or to undo what oth-
ers before him have done; to put this man up and that man down, as the 
system of political rewards and punishments shall seem to him to demand." 
S. Rep. 576, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1882). 
See generally House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History 
of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign 
Countries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26--173 (1976). 
17 SeeS. Rep. No. 576, supra n. 16, at 9; compare H. R. Rep. No. 1826, 
47th Con g., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1882) (rejected provisions of House bill permit-
ting removals only for cause). 
18 Section 13 provided, 
"No officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act shall 
discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in manner change the official rank or 
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Congressional attention to the problem of politically-moti-
vated removals was again prompted by the issuance of Exec-
utive Orders by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft that forbade 
federal employees to communicate directly with Congress 
without the permission of their supervisors. 19 These "gag 
compensation of any other officer or employee, or promise or threaten so to 
do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of 
money or other valuable thing for any political purpose." 
Other sections made it unlawful for government employees to solicit po-
litical contributions from, and to give such contributions to, other govern-
ment employees, §§ 11, 14, and to receive any political contributions on 
government premises, § 12. Section 2 required the Civil Service Commis-
sion to promulgate rules providing, inter alia, "that no person in the public 
service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any politi-
cal fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed 
or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so," and also "that no person in 
said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce 
the political action of any person or body. 22 Stat. 404. See 5 U. S. C. 
§ 2302(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); 5 U. S. C. §§ 7321-7323 (1976). 
19 In 1906 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 1142, which 
provided that: 
"All officers and employees of the United States of every description, 
serving in or under any of the executive departments or independent Gov-
ernment establishments, and whether so serving in or out of Washington, 
are hereby forbidden, either directly or indirectly, individually or through 
associations, to solicit an increase of pay or to influence or attempt to influ-
ence in their own interest any other legislation whatever, either before 
Congress or its committees, or in any way save through the heads of the 
departments or independent Government establishments in or under which 
they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the Government service. Theo-
dore Roosevelt." 
President Taft issued another order, Executive Order No. 1514, in 1909: 
"It is hereby ordered that no bureau, office, or division chief, or subordi-
nate in any department of the Government, and no officer of the Army or 
Navy or Marine Corps stationed in Washington, shall apply to either 
House of Congress, or to any committee of either House of Congress, or to 
any Member of Congress, for legislation or for appropriations, or for con-
gressional action of any kind, except with the consent and knowledge of the 
head of the department; nor shall any such person respond to any request 
for information from either House of Congress, or any committee of either 
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orders," enforced by dismissal, were cited by several legisla-
tors as the reason for enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette Act in 
1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, § 6. 20 That statute provided that "no 
person in the classified Civil Service of the United States 
shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will pro-
mote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given in 
writing, .... " 21 Moreover, it explicitly guaranteed that the 
right of civil servants "to furnish information to either House 
of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall 
not be denied or interfered with." 22 As the House Report 
explained, this legislation was intended "to protect employ-
ees against oppression and in the right of free speech and the 
right to consult their representatives." 23 In enacting the 
House of Congress, or any member of Congress, except through or as au-
thorized by the head of his department. William H. Taft." 
48 Cong. Rec. 4513, 5223, 5634, 5635, 10673, 10729-10730 (1912). 
20 See 48 Cong. Rec. 4513 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Gregg) ("[l]t is for the 
purpose of wiping out the existence of this despicable 'gag rule' that this 
provision is inserted. The rule is unjust, unfair, and against the provi-
sions of the Constitution of the United States, which provides for the right 
of appeal and the right of free speech to all its citizens.") A number of the 
bill's proponents asserted that the gag rule violated the First Amendment 
rights of civil servants. See, e. g., id., at 4653 (remarks of Rep. Calder) 
(1912); id., at 4738 (remarks of Rep. Blackmon); id., at 5201 (remarks of 
Rep. Prouty); id., at 5223 (remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy); id., at 5634 (re-
marks of Rep. Lloyd); id., at 5637-5638 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); id., at 
10671 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst); id., at 10673 (remarks of Sen. Reed); id., 
at 10793 (remarks of Sen. Smith); id., at 10799 (remarks of Sen. 
LaFollette). 
21 The statute also required notice and reasons and an opportunity for the 
employee to answer the charges in writing with supporting affidavits. 
These requirements had previously been adopted by President McKinley in 
an Executive Order issued in 1897, but they were not judicially enforce-
able. History of Civil Service Merit Systems, supra n. 16, at 202-203. 
22 This provision was accompanied by a more specific guarantee that 
membership in any independent association of postal employees seeking 
improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions, or the presenta-
tion to Congress of any grievance, "shall not constitute or be cause for re-
duction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of 
persons from said service." 
22 H. R. Rep. No. 388, 62d Con g., 2d Sess. 7 (1912). 
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Lloyd-LaFollette Act, Congress weighed the competing pol-
icy considerations and concluded that efficient management 
of government operations did not preclude the extension of 
free speech rights to government employees. 24 
In the ensuing years, repeated consideration of the con- \ 
flicting interests involved in providing job security, protect-
ing the right to speak freely, and maintaining discipline and 
efficiency in the federal workforce gave rise to additional leg-
24 Members of the House, which originated § 6, suggested that it would 
improve the efficiency and morale of the civil service. "It will do away 
with the discontent and suspicion which now exists among the employees 
and will restore that confidence which is necessary to get the best results 
from the employees." 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Cal-
der); see id., at 5635 (remarks of Rep. Lloyd). 
The Senate Committee initially took a different position, urging in its re-
port that the relevant language, see id., at 10732 (House version) be omit-
ted entirely: 
"As to the last clause in section 6, it is the view of the committee that all 
citizens have a constitutional right as such to present their grievances to 
Congress or Members thereof. But governmental employees occupy a po-
sition relative to the Government different from that of ordinary citizens. 
Upon questions of interest to them as citizens, governmental employees 
have a right to petition Congress direct. A different rule should prevail 
with regard to their presentation of grievances connected with their rela-
tion to the Government as employees. In that respect good discipline and 
the efficiency of the service requires that they present their grievances 
through the proper administrative channels." S. Rep. No. 955, 62d Cong. 
2d Sess. 21 (1912). 
As Sen. Bourne explained, "it was believed by the committee that to recog-
nize the right of the individual employee to go over the head of his superior 
and go to Members of Congress on matters appertaining to his own particu-
lar grievances, or for his own selfish interest, would be detrimental to the 
service itself; that it would absolutely destroy the discipline necessary for 
good service." 48 Cong. Rec. 10676· (1912). 
This view did not prevail. After extended discussion in floor debate 
concerning the right to organize and the right to present grievances to 
Congress, id., at 10671-10677, 10728-10733, 10792-10804, the committee 
offered and the Senate approved a compromise amendment to the House 
version-guaranteeing both rights at least in part-which was subse-
quently enacted into law. Id., at 10804; 37 Stat. 555. 
I 
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25 Among the most significant are the Veterans Preference Act of 1944, 
58 Stat. 390 (protecting veterans in federal employment by extending the 
1912 Act's procedural and substantive protections to adverse actions other 
than removals, and adding the right to respond orally and to appeal to the 
Civil Service Commission); the Back Pay Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 354 (extend-
ing the protections against removal contained in the 1912 Act to all employ-
ees who were suspended without pay; permitting back pay awards to cer-
tain categories of employees who were improperly removed or suspended 
and to victims of improper reductions in force); the Back Pay Act of 1966, 
81 Stat. 203 (1967) (extending the right to back pay and lost benefits to 
every employee affected by a personnel action subsequently found to be 
unjustified); and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1134 (shift-
ing adjudicative functions of Civil Service Commission to the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board, modifying administrative appeals procedures, and 
providing new protections for so-called "whistleblowers"). 
~Exec. Order No. 10988, § 14, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, 556 (1962), and Exec. 
Order No. 11491, §22, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605, 17614 (1969), printed in note 
following 5 U. S. C. § 7301 (1976), gave all employees in the competitive 
service the right to appeal adverse actions to the Civil Service Commis-
sion, and made the administrative remedy applicable to adverse personnel 
actions other than removal and suspension without pay. 
27 See 5 CFR §§ 752, 772 (1975). 
28 Not all personnel actions are covered by this system. For example, 
there are no provisions for appeal of suspensions for 14 days or less, 5 
U. S. C. § 7503 (Supp. V 1981), suspension and removal from positions in 
certain agencies in the interests of national security, 5 U. S. C. §§ 7531, 
7532 (1976), and adverse actions against probationary employees, 5 
U. S. C. § 7511 (Supp. V 1981). In addition, certain actions by supervi-
sors against federal employees, such as wiretapping, warrantless searches, 
or uncompensated takings, would not be defined as "personnel actions" 
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tional challenges to agency action, such as the first Amend-
ment claims raised by petitioner, are fully co~izable within 
this system. As the record in this case demonstrates, the 
Government's com. rehensive scheme is costl to administer, 
but 1t provi es meaningru remedies for employees who may 
have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments 
about their agencies. 29 
A federal employee in the competitive service may be re-
moved or demoted "only for such cause as will promote the 
efficiency of the service." 30 The regulations applicable at the 
time of petitioner's demotion in 1975,31 which are substan-
tially similar to those now in effect, required that an em-
ployee be given 30 days' written notice of a proposed dis-
charge, suspension, or demotion, accompanied by the 
agency's reasons and a copy of the charges. The employee 
then had the right to examine all disclosable materials that 
damages actions based on such actions are barred. 
29 Petitioner received retroactive reinstatement and $30,000 in back pay. 
An empirical study found that approximately one quarter of the adverse 
actions in the federal civil service were contested. Merrill, Procedures for 
Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 Va. L. Rev. 196, 198-199 
(1973). In 1970, agency appeals succeeded in 20% of removal cases and 
24% of demotion cases. Before the Civil Service Commission, 47% of 
those employees who appealed demotions and 24% of those who contested 
removal were successful. I d. , at 204 n. 35. 
30 Prior to the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, this 
protection was accorded in part by st:itu€e, 5 U. S. C. § 7501(a) (!976) (re-
movals and suspensions without pay of non-preference-eligible employees); 
id. § 7512(a) (removals, suspensions without pay, reductions in grade or 
pay, and other adverse actions against preference-eligible employees), and 
in part by Executive Orders, see n. 26, supra, implemented in Civil Serv-
ice Commission regulations, 5 CFR §§ 752.104(a) , 752.201 (1975) (adverse 
actions, including reductions in grade or pay, against covered employees, 
including non-preference-eligibles). The 1978 amendments retained the 
general rule , 5 U. S. C. § 7513(a) (Supp. V 1981), and supplemented it by 
specifying certain "prohibited personnel practices. " § 2302. 
31 Various aspects of the regulations discussed in text were added at dif-
ferent times. See generally Merrill, supra n. 29, at 214-218. 
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formed the basis of the proposed action, 5 CFR § 752.202(a) 
(1975), the right to answer the charges with a statement and 
supporting affidavits, and the right to make an oral non-evi-
dentiary presentation to an agency official. § 752.202(b). 32 
The regulations required that the final agency decision be 
made by an official higher in rank than the official who pro-
posed the adverse action, § 752.202(f). The employee was 
entitled to notification in writing stating which of the initial 
reasons had been sustained. Ibid.; 5 U. S. C. § 7501(b)(4) 
(1976). 
The next step was a right to appeal to the Civil Service 
Commission's Federal Employee Appeals Authority. 5 
CFR §§ 752.203, 772.101 (1975). 33 The Appeals Authority 
was required to hold a trial-type hearing at which the em-
ployee could present witnesses, cross-examine the agency's 
witnesses, and secure the attendance of agency officials, 
§ 772.307(c), 34 and then to render a written decision, 
§ 772.309(a). An adverse decision by the FEAA was judi-
cially reviewable in either federal district court or the Court 
of Claims. 35 In addition, the employee had the right to ask 
32 Under the statute, before and after the 1978 amendments, the agency 
has the discretionary authority to provide an evidentiary hearing. 5 
U. S. C. § 7501(b) (1976); 5 U. S. C. § 7513(c) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR 
§ 752.404(g) (1983). As amended in 1978, the statute gives the employee 
the right to representation by an attorney or other person. 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7513(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR § 752.404(e) (1983). 
33 The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act gave the Commission's adjudicative 
functions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 5 U. S. C. 
§§ 1205, 7543(d), 7701 (Supp. V 1981). 
84 The Commission's regulations did not specify which party carried the 
burdens of production and persuasion. Nevertheless, participants in the 
process and reviewing courts assumed that the burden was on the agency 
to prove that the adverse action was justified. Merrill, supra n. 29, at 
251; Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals and 
Other Adverse Actions, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 178, 192-193 (1972). 
"' Under the law now in effect, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB. 
-
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the Commission's Appeals Review Board to reopen an ad-
verse decision by the FEAA. § 772.310. 
If the employee prevailed in the administrative process or 
upon judicial review, he was entitled to reinstatement with 
retroactive seniority. § 752.402. He also had a right to full 
back pay, including credit for periodic within-grade or step 
increases and general pay raises during the relevant period, 
allowances, differentials, and accumulated leave. § 550.803. 
Congress intended that these remedies would put the em-
ployee "in the same position he would have been in had the 
unjustified ~s personnel action not taken place." 36 
Given th~ the development of civil service reme-
dies and the comprehensive nature of the remedies currently 
available, it is clear that the question we confront today is / 
ql,l_ite different ~the typical remedial issue confronte<(by 
a c ommon-law court. The question is not what remedy the 
cOUrt shoul(f provide for a wrong that would otherwise go un-
redressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that 
has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to 
conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the 
creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional viola-
tion at issue. That question obviously cannot be answered 
simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide com-
plete relief for the plaintiff. The~ JUdgmenft should be 
informed by a thorough understan lrigOf the existing regula-
tory structure and the respective costs and benefits that 
would result from the addition of another remedy for viola-
tions of employees' First Amendment rights. 
The costs associated with the review of disciplinary deci-
sions are alreaay sigruficant-not only in mone9!:J terms, 
but also m The time and energy of managerial persQD.nel.Jyho 
5 U. S. C. § 7703 (Supp. V 1981); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, § 127(a), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (to be codified at 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1295). 
36 S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th. Cong. , 2d Sess. 1 (1966). 
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must defend their decisions. The Government argues that 
supervisory ersonnel are already more hesitant than they 
shou e m admirus ermg ISClp ine, because the review that 
en'Su.es ine"'Vita61'y"makes Uie performance of their regular du-
ties more difficult. Brief for the United States 37-41. 
Whether or not this assessment is accurate, it is quite proba-
ble that if management personnel face the added risk of per-
sonal liability for decisions that they believe to be a correct 
response to improper criticism of the agency, they would be JJA..,. ~ 
deterred from imposing discipline in future cases. fn all - r 
events, Congress is in a far better positiOn than"' a court to 
evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between 
federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service. Not 
only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with 
balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employ-
ees, but it also may inform itself through factfinding proce-
dures such as hearings that are not available to the courts. 
Nor is there any reason to discount Congress' ability to 1 
make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creat-
ing a new remedy for federal employees who have been de-
moted or discharged for expressing controversial views. 
Congress has a special interest in informing itself about the 
efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past 
it has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level govern-
ment employees are a valuable source of information, and 
that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their 
subordinates' freedom of expression. 37 Moreover, federal 
37 There is a remarkable similarity between comments made in Congress 
in 1912, when the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was passed, and in 1978, when the 
Civil Service Reform Act was enacted. In 1912, Rep. Calder stated, 
"There are always two sides to every question, and surely if any man is 
competent to express an opinion regarding the needs of the postal service it 
is the men who perform the actual work. If anyone is competent to make 
known unsatisfactory working conditions, who, might I ask, is better quali-
fied to lay his proper grievances before Congress than the men who have 
complaints to make and who suffer from these grievances?" 48 Cong. Rec. 
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employees are a well organized group whos 
in the halls of Congress. 38 
23 
Thus, w do not decide on the merits whether a federal em-
ployee should be allowed to recover damages from a supervi-
sor w o as improper y d1sc1p me 1m for exercising his 
First Amendment rights. As we did in Standard Oil, we de-
cline "to create a new substantive legal liability without legis-
lative ai an as a the common aw" 332 U. S., at 302, be-
cause we are convinced that Congress is in a better PQ.Sition 
to decide whether or not the public interest would be served 
b:{CFeatlng it. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
4653 (1912). In 1978, a Senate Committee Print stated, "Federal em-
ployees are often the source of information about agency operations sup-
pressed by their superiors. Since they are much closer to the actual work-
ing situation than top agency officials, they have testified before Congress, 
spoken to reporters, and informed the public. Mid-level employees pro-
vide much of the information Congress needs to evaluate programs, bud-
gets, and overall agency performance." Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs, The Whistle blowers, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (Comm. Print 
1978). See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 386--387 
(1978); S. Rep. No. 95-696, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978). 
38 See, e. g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and Reorganization Plan 
No. 2 of 1978, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs 
on S. 2640, S. 2707, S. 2830, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. iii-v (1978) (list of wit-
nesses). It is somewhat less clear that prison inmates such as the 
plaintiff in Carlson v. Green, supra, have the same access to Congressional 
attention as civil servants, or that the majority is as responsive to their 
interests. See Brief for the United States 43-44 (unlike prisoners, federal 
employees are not "a historically disadvantaged or vulnerable group"). In 
addition, over the years Congress has been much more active in regulating 
federal personnel policy than in limiting Executive discretion in the man-
agement of federal prisons. 
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.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
May 18, 1983 
No. 81-469 Bush v. Lucas 
Dear Jot;m, 
I am prepared to join your opinion with one minor 
change in the first sentence of the first full paragraph on 
page 23. As presently drafted, it states "we do not decide 
on the merits whether a federal employee should be allowed 
to recover damages ..•• " 
I believe that the opinion is indeed a 
determination on the merits of Lucas' claim in this case. I 
assume the sentence is intended to express the . thought that 
we are not passing on the advisability of the creation by 
Congress of a damages remedy. 
lines? 
would you consider a change along the following 
"Thus, we do not address the 
advisability of permitting a federal employee 
to recover damages from a supervisor who has 
improperly disciplined him for exercising his 
First Amendment rights." 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
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.. rurlfin:gton. ~. <q:. 20bTJl.$ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 18, 1983 
81-469 - Bush v. Lucas 
Dear Sandra: 
Your point is well taken. I trust it will be 
satisfactory if I revise the sentence to read this way: 
"Thus, we do not deicde whether or not it 
would be good policy to permit a federal employee 
to recover damages from a supervisor who has 
improperly disciplined him for exercising his 





Copies to the Conference 
May 19, 1983 
81-469 Bush v. Lucas 
Do not join. Carlson made a mess out of this 
area of the law, and this case reflects it. I have some 
problems with this draft, but changes could 
possible to join: 
make it 
1. This is a minor point, but I find n. 7 on p. 
5 as suggesting that the merits of petitioner's 1st A 
claim is a close issue. I would prefer not to say 
anything about the merits and would suggest removing the 
note. 
2. 1st full paragraph, p. 6, second sentence: 
the Court is stuck with Carlson in the constitutional tort 
area, but there is noj reason to suggest that this is the 
Court's standard with respect to other implied causes of 
action. Your opinions have made the relevant inquiry --
clear, and I think this sentence needs to be --. . ()., . 
qual1f1ed ~propr1ately. The third sentence makes this 
clear, but someone will use the second sentence out of 
context if it is not changed some. 
3. Page 11 is the most troubling page. The 
third sentence holds that this Court is the judge of the 
remedy to determine its adequacy. I find this troubling 
L.. 
because I do not think that Congress m~t provide remedies 
for certain violations. Assuming, however, that there 
msut be an adequate remedy, I find the next sentence to 
say that, in some areas, this Court can still supplement 
the "adequate" legislative scheme with a damages remedy. 
The first sentence of the second paragraph 
suggests that Congress has not given the Court its answer 
in this area. I find this odd, since our answer in the 
end turns on the existence of a cumbersome review 
procedure for civil servants. I think Justice Stevens 
avoids stating what should be the true issue here, as in 
all implied-cause-of-action cases: what did Congress -----intend as to the 1st A violations alleged here. I think 
that question si simply answered by pointing to the civil 
service review system as preempting judicial action in 
this area. In some ways, I think Justice Stevens decides 
the questions he purports to leave open in n. 14 {p. 11). 
And I do not think he is right on the merits of that 
question. 
4. On p. 13, first full paragraph, Justice 
Stevens posits the issue as "who decides?" I would have 
thought "Congress" would be the easy answer to that, and 
the Court's task is to determine congressional intent. I 
,j • 
find his stated inquiry in the last sentence of part II to 
be somewhat inappropriate for the Court. See also, pp. 21 
and 23. 
5. Note footnote 28 on p. 18. I am sure you will want to 
remove the suggestion that there might be a damage action 
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Dear John, 
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May 19, 1983 
No. 81-469 Bush v. Lucas 
Your proposed language is fine. Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHA.MBERS OF' 
.:§uvr~uu <rJllurlllf tir~'Jllniu~ ~tates­
:.as-.qm.gron. ~. <!J. 2n~J!.~ 
.. 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 20, 1983 
Re: 81-469 - Bush v. Lucas 
Dear Bill: 
Would it satisfy your concerns if I revised the 
paragraph at the top of page 11 to read as follows: 
"This much is established by our prior 
cases. The federal courts' statutory 
jurisdiction to decide federal questions 
confers adequate power to award damages to 
the victim of a constitutional violation. 
When Congress provides an alternative remedy, 
it may, of course, indicate its intent, by 
statutory language, by clear legisla~ive 
history, or perhaps even by the statutory 
remedy itself, that the Court's power should 
n~ed. In fne absence of such a 
congressional directive, the federal courts 
must make the kind of remedial determination 
that is appropriate for a common-law 
tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to 
any special factors counselling hesitation 
before authorizing a new kind of federal 
litigation." 
- ~ 
With respect to your concern about footnote 38 and 
the runover sentence on pages 22 and 23, I would much 
rather have your vote than either the footnote or the 
sentence. You're dead right, of course, about Davis, 
but I was struggling for ways to separate this case 
from Carlson and thought the point had enough merit to 
buttress the different result in the two cases. I 
I 
wonder if it would be acceptable to you to incorporate 
the sentence in the text as well as footnote 38 into 
the end of footnote 37. If you feel strongly about it 
-2-
and others agree with you, I will of course eliminate 
it entirely subject, of course, to any comment that may 
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Re: No. 81-469 Bush v. Lucas 1 ~ 
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Dear John: C/k- 2YzJ qL ~ 29' 
I think you have done a fine job on a difficult 
opinion. I do, however, have some concern with the first 
paragraph on p. 11 and with the carry-over sentence on pp. 
22-23. 
The second sentence of the paragraph on p. 11 states 
"As long as it provides a constitutionally adequate if not 
identical alternative remedy, Congress may express its 
intent, by statutory language or clear legislative history, 
that such power should not be exercised." I have several 
difficulties with this proposition. It may fairly be read 
as expressing the view that if Congress does not provide a 
"constitutionally adequate if not identical alternative 
remedy," then it may not deny federal courts the power to 
invoke a particular remedy. To my mind, this is 
inconsistent with the statement in note 14, that "we need 
not reach the question whether the Constitution itself 
requires a judicially-fashioned damages remedy in the 
absence of any other remedy to vindicate the underlying 
right, unless there is an express textual command to the 
contrary." I agree with note 14, which I take to mean that 
we need not decide in this case whether the Constitution 
places any requirements on the type of remedies Congress 
makes available in federal court under §1331. The sentence, 
quoted above, in text on p. 11 suggests that there is some 
standard of "constitutional adequacy" applicable to remedies 
for constitutional violations. I do not think this case 
requires us to decide whether or not Congress could entirely 
abrogate a personal damages action for, by way of example, 
Fourth Amendment violations, and I would prefer not to 
prejudge the issue, as I think the sentence as currently 
phrased does. (Indeed, although I am sure the opposite was 
intended, the sentence might even be read as suggesting that 
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alternative remedies created by Congress must be "identical" 
to a Bivens damage action.} 
I also am concerned that the paragraph may create a 
mistaken impression regarding the continued vitality of the 
second reason, articulated in Carlson v. Green, 446 u.s. 14 
(1980}, for not implying a Bivens remedy. Carlson, of 
course, said that when "Congress has provided an alternative 
remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for 
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as 
equally effective." Id., at 18-19. It seems to me that the 
first paragraph on p. 11 shifts the focus of this prong from 
what Congress thinks is "equally effective" to what the 
courts think is equally effective. The draft states 
f 
"Moreover, by creating an equally effective remedy, Congress 
may eliminate the need for judicial recognition of a Bivens-
type action for damages." I would prefer to stay with the 
notion that the primary decision as to the efficacy of an 
alternative remedy should rest on Congress. (Indeed, this 
view seems far more consistent with the notion that Congress 
possesses greater competence than the Court in certain 
areas, which you have adopted as the theme of your opinion.} 
~ My second concern is with aspects of the carry-over 
~23, and the accompanying footnote. 
First, as to the final sentence of note 38, I wonder whether 
congressional inactivity in regulating an area necessarily 
cuts against a Bivens remedy. In the area of national 
security, for example, I would think congressional 
inactivity represents its considered judgment that the 
executive can do a better job than the legislative branch. 
Such a position would suggest to me that the courts would do 
well to follow Congress's example. (I suppose, given the 
second example in note 28, that future cases in this area 
are not entirely hypothetical.} 
More generally, I doubt that courts can make principled 
decisions based on the degree of access of certain groups to 
Congress. First, it is difficult to see any way to decide 
what groups have influence and what groups do not. 
Moreover, different groups have varying amounts of access to 
Congress, depending largely upon the issue involved. (The 
plaintiff in Davis, for example, was a federal employee, and 
perhaps a member of NOW, but the influence of these groups 
was unable to provide her with any remedy.} I fear that if 
we attempt to ascertain the political power of various 
groups we will lead ourselves and the lower courts into a 
confusing areas lacking any real guidelines. I think this 
t 
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would be unfortunate because the other factors you 
articulate in determining whether Congress is better able to 
make judgments in a particular area do, to my way of 
thinking, provide useful guidance. 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely',...~ 
y fVV 
lfp/ss 05/23/83 /lJ "j-~ ~ 
·~d~ 81-469 Bush v. Lucas ~~ 
Consider asking John to change the first L} 
in the second paragraph on page 11 to read substantia/lt ~J 
follows: 
"Congress has not resolved the question pre-
sented by this case by expressly denying pe-
titioner the judicial remedy. Indeed, Con-
gress rarely is explicit with respect to 
whether statutory remedies are preemptive. 14 
We therefore must endeavor to ascertain the 
intention of Congress, looking to the legis-
lative history as we customarily do, and also 
considering whether a damages remedy would 
involve any 'special factors counseling hesi-
tation'. 
As indicated above, John, I find that both of 
these considerations strongly support denial of a Bivens 
action in this case. 
I cannot recall a single example of Congress hav-
ing declared that remedies it prescribed were exclusive. 
Nor can I recall a legislative history, comparable to that 
before us in this case, that demonstrates so clearly that 
over several decades Congress has considered with care the 
rights and remedies of the government's own employees. It 
is ~nreasonahle to suggest either that Congress simply 
overlooked the possibility of a damages remedy (Bivens has 
been on the books for more than a decade) or that it intend-
ed - as the Court found in Carlson - that the legislative 
remedies were merely "parallel or complementary" to those 
elaborately provided. Indeed, as I recall Harry saying at 
Conference, in some respects the statutory remedies are con-
siderably more protective than any damages remedy. After 
all, they have demonstrated their effectiveness in assuring 
continuity of federal employment that ends with retirement 
benefits that are the envy of many in the private sector. 
Given the foregoing views, I would have difficulty 
in joining the final paragraph in your opinion unless you 
are willing affirmatively to decide the merits of this case. 
Nor do I think it is at all necessary for us to volunteer 
any observation as to whether a Bivens remedy would or would 
not be "good policy". Surely, few subjects have been con-
sidered with greater care over a longer period of years than 
the civil service. 
I would like very much to join your opinion. I 
recognize the problems inherent in some of our past deci-
sions that you endeavored in a scholarly to obviate. If you 
could make it clear that these problems, though requiring 
discussion, are really not at all serious in light of the 
long history of congressional concern for the civil service 
and also in view of the "range of policy considerations" 
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Re: No. 81-469 Bush v. Lucas 
Dear John: 
The proposal in your letter of May 20th is quite 
satisfactory so far as my concerns about the paragraph 
at the top of p. 11 of your present draft are concerned. 
Insofar as fn. 38 and the run-over sentence on pp. 22 and 23 
are concerned, your proposal is certainly acceptable; I 
would prefer the course suggested in my letter to you, but 
will leave it entirely to your discretion. 
If you will make the proposed modification in the 
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May 23, 1983 
No. 81-469 Bush v. Lucas 
Dear John, 
I agree with the changes proposed in 
response to Bill Rehnquist's suggestions. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 









From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: __ IW_2._4_'83 ___ ..... 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-469 
WILLIAM C. BUSH, PETITIONER v. 
WILLIAM R. LUCAS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1983] 
JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner asks us to authorize a new nonstatutory dam-
ages remedy for federal employees whose first Amendment 
rights are violated by their superiors. Because such claims 
arise out of an employment relationship that is governed by 
comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving 
meaningful remedies against the United States, we conclude 
that it would be inappropriate for us to supplement that regu-
latory scheme with a new judicial remedy. 
Petitioner Bush is an aerospace engineer employed at the 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, a major facility op-
erated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion in Alabama. Respondent Lucas is the Director of the 
Center. In 1974 the facility was reorganized and petitioner 
was twice reassigned to new positions. He objected to both 
reassignments and sought formal review by the Civil Service 
Commission. 1 In May and June 1975, while some of his ad-
ministrative appeals were pending, he made a number of 
public statements, including two televised interviews, that 
1 The record indicates that petitioner filed two appeals from the first re-
f\ · · assignment and three appeals from the second. App. to Pet. for Writ of 
tJ6 ""* S ~ Cert. e-3 to e-4. He asserts that he had previously made unsuccessful at-
1\ . t tempts within the Center to obtain redress. App. 30. 
-~ ~~ ot tM . 
~~.~~ o()'&~ ~~ ~~ ~~~ 
~· ¥-
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were highly critical of the agency. The news media quoted 
him as saying that he did not have enough meaningful work 
to keep him busy, that his job was "a travesty and worth-
less," and that the taxpayers' money was being spent fraudu-
lently and wastefully at the Center. His statements were 
reported on local television, in the local newspaper, and in a 
national press release that appeared in newspapers in at least 
three other States. 2 
In June 1975 respondent, in response to a reporter's in-
quiry, stated that he had conducted an investigation and 
that petitioner's statements regarding his job had "no basis in 
fact." App. 15. In August 1975 an adverse personnel ac-
tion was initiated to remove petitioner from his position. 
Petitioner was charged with "publicly mak[ing] intemperate 
remarks which were misleading and often false, evidencing a 
malicious attitude towards Management and generating an 
environment of sensationalism demeaning to the Govern-
ment, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and the personnel of the George C. Marshall Space Flight 
Center, thereby impeding Government efficiency and econ-
omy and adversely affecting public confidence in the Govern-
ment service." He was also informed that his conduct had 
undermined morale at the Center and caused disharmony and 
disaffection among his fellow employees. 3 · Petitioner had 
the opportunity to file a written response and to make an oral 
presentation to agency officials. Respondent then deter-
mined that petitioner's statements were false and misleading 
and that his conduct would justify removal, but that the 
lesser penalty of demotion was appropriate for a "first of-
fense." App. 15. He approved a reduction in grade from 
GS-14 to GS-12, which decreased petitioner's annual salary 
by approximately $9,716. 
2 App. to Pet. for Cert. d-2 to d-3 (memorandum opinion of District 
Court); id. , at e-19 (opinion of Federal Employee Appeals Authority). 
3 !d., at f-2 to f-3, e-19, e-7. 
81-469-0PINION 
BUSH v. LUCAS 3 
Petitioner exercised his right to appeal to the Federal Em-
ployee Appeals Authority. After a three-day public hear-
ing, the Authority upheld some of the charges and concluded 
that the demotion was justified. It specifically determined 
that a number of petitioner's public statements were mislead-
ing and that, for three reasons, they "exceeded the bounds of 
expression protected by the First Amendment." First, peti-
tioner's statements did not stem from public interest, but 
from his desire to have his position abolished so that he could 
take early retirement and go to law school. Second, the 
statements conveyed the erroneous impression that the 
agency was deliberately wasting public funds, thus discredit-
ing the agency and its employees. Third, there was no le-
gitimate public interest to be served by abolishing petition-
er's position. 4 
Two years after the Appeals Authority's decision, peti-
tioner requested the Civil Service Commission's Appeals Re-
view Board to reopen the proceeding. The Board reexam-
ined petitioner's First Amendment claim and, after making a 
detailed review of the record and the applicable authorities, 
applied the balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board 
of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). On the one hand, it ac-
knowledged the evidence tending to show that petitioner's 
motive might have been personal gain, and the evidence that 
his statements caused some disruption of the agency's day-to-
day routine. On the other hand, it noted that society as well 
as the individual had an interest in free speech, including "a 
right to disclosure of information about how tax dollars are 
spent and about the functioning of government apparatus, an 
interest in the promotion of the efficiency of the government, 
and in the maintenance of an atmosphere of freedom of ex-
pression by the scientists and engineers who are responsible 
4 !d., at e-38 to e-39. Petitioner could have obtained judicial review of 
the Authority's determination by filing suit in a federal district court or in 
the U. S. Court of Claims, but did not do so. 
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for the planning and implementation of the nation's space 
program." Because petitioner's statements, though some-
what exaggerated, "were not wholly without truth, they 
properly stimulated public debate." Thus the nature and ex-
tent of proven disruption to the agency's operations did not 
"justify abrogation of the exercise of free speech." 5 The 
Board recommended that petitioner be restored to his former 
position, retroactively to November 30, 1975, and that here-
ceive back pay. That recommendation was accepted. Peti-
tioner received approximately$ 30,000 in back pay. 
While his administrative appeal was pending, petitioner 
filed an action against respondent in state court in Alabama 
seeking to recover damages for defamation and violation of 
his constitutional rights. Respondent removed the lawsuit 
to the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Alabama, which granted respondent's motion for summary 
judgment. It held, first, that the defamation claim could not 
be maintained because, under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
(1959), respondent was absolutely immune from liability for 
damages for defamation; and second, that petitioner's demo-
tion was not a constitutional deprivation for which a damages 
action could be maintained. 6 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 598 F. 2d 958 (1979). 
We vacated that court's judgment, 446 U. S. 914 (1980), and 
directed that it reconsider the case in the light of our inter-
vening decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). 
The Court of Appeals again affirmed the judgment against 
petitioner. It adhered to its previous conclusion "that plain-
tiff had no cause of action for damages under the First 
Amendment for retaliatory demotion in view of the available 
remedies under the Civil Service Commission regulations." 
647 F. 2d 573, 574 (1981). It explained that the relationship 
between the Federal Government and its civil service em-
6 I d., at f-23 to f-25. 
6 ld. , at d-2 to d-17. 
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ployees was a special factor counselling against the judicial 
recognition of a damages remedy under the Constitution in 
this context. 
We assume for purposes of decision that petitioner's First 
Amendment rights were violated by the adverse personnel 
action. 7 We also assume that, as petitioner asserts, civil 
service remedies were not as effective as an individual dam-
ages remedy 8 and did not fully compensate him for the harm 
he suffered. 9 Two further propositions are undisputed. 
Congress has not expressly authorized the damages remedy 
that petitioner asks us to provide. On the other hand, Con-
gress has not expressly precluded the creation of such a rem-
edy by declaring that existing statutes provide the exclusive 
mode of redress. 
Thus, we assume, a federal right has been violated and 
Congress has provided a less than complete remedy for the 
wrong. If we were writing on a clean slate, we might an-
swer the question whether to supplement the statutory 
7 Competent decisionmakers may reasonably disagree about the merits 
of petitioner's First Amendment claim. Compare the opinion of the Dis-
trict Court, App. D to Pet. for Writ of Cert., and the opinion of the Atlanta 
Field Office of the Federal Employees Appeal Authority issued on August 
12, 1976, App. E, both rejecting petitioner's claims, with the opinion of the 
Appeals Review Board issued on July 14, 1978, App. F, finding that the 
First Amendment had been violated. This question is not before us. 
8 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 20-23 (1980) (factors making Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act recovery less "effective" than an action under the 
Constitution to recover damages against the individual official). Peti-
tioner contends that, unlike a damages remedy against respondent indi-
vidually, civil service remedies against the Government do not provide 
for punitive damages or a jury trial and do not adequately deter the uncon-
stitutional exercise of authority by supervisors. Brief for Petitioner 
27-29. 
9 His attorney's fees were not paid by the Government, and he claims to 
have suffered uncompensated emotional and dignitary harms. !d., at 
24-26. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not need to decide 
whether such costs could be recovered as compensation in an action 
brought directly under the Constitution. 
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scheme in either of two quite simple ways. We might adopt 
the common-law approach to the judicial recognition of new 
causes of action and hold that it is the province of the judi-
ciary to fashion an adequate remedy for every wrong that can 
be proved in a case over which a court has jurisdiction. 10 Or 
we might start from the premise that federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction whose remedial powers do not 
extend beyond the granting of relief expressly authorized by 
Congress. 11 Under the former approach, petitioner would 
obviously prevail; under the latter, it would be equally clear 
that he would lose. 
Our prior cases, although sometimes emphasizing one ap-
proach and sometimes the other, have unequivocally rejected 
both extremes. They establish our power to grant relief 
that is not expressly authorized by statute, but they also re-
mind us that such power is to be exercised in the light of rele-
vant policy determinations made by the Congress. We 
therefore first review some of the cases establishing our 
power to remedy violations of the Constitution and then con-
sider the bearing of the existing statutory scheme on the pre-
cise issue presented by this case. 
I 
The federal courts' power to grant relief not expressly au-
thorized by Congress is firmly established. Under 28 
U. S. C. § 1331 (1976), the federal courts have jurisdiction to 
'
0 In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803), Chief Justice 
Marshall invoked the authority of Blackstone's Commentaries in support of 
this proposition. Blackstone had written, "it is a general and indisputable 
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, 
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded .... it is a settled and in-
variable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, 
must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." 3 Commentar-
ies 23, 109. 
11 See Bivens v. Six Unknoum Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 428 
(1971) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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decide all cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States." This jurisdictional grant pro-
vides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of ac-
tion is stated by a plaintiffs claim that he has been injured by 
a violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 
684 (1946), but also the authority to choose among available 
judicial remedies in order te vindicate constitutional rights. 
This Court has fashioned a'· wide variety of nonstatutory rem-
edies for violations of the Constitution by federal and state 
officials. 12 The cases most relevant to the problem before us 
are those in which the Court has held that the Constitution 
itself supports a private cause of action for damages against 
a federal official. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 
228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). 
In Bivens the plaintiff alleged that federal agents, without 
a warrant or probable cause, had arrested him and searched 
his home in a manner causing him great humiliation, embar-
rassment, and mental suffering. He claimed damages on the 
theory that the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment 
provided an independent basis for relief. The Court upheld 
the sufficiency of his complaint, rejecting the argument that a 
state tort action in trespass provided the only appropriate ju-
12 See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882) (ejectment action 
against federal officers to enforce Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment); 
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 64--65 (1900) (damages against state officer 
for denying plaintiffs right to vote in federal election); Ex parte Young, 
209 U. S. 123 (1908) (injunctive relief against state official for violation 
of Fourteenth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398 
(1914) (exclusion in federal criminal case of evidence seized in violation of 
Fourth Amendment); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933) 
(award of interest as well as principal in just compensation claim founded 
on the Fifth Amendment); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Edu-
cation, 402 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (school busing to remedy unconstitutional 
racial segregation). See generally Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 
Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1124-1127 (1969). 
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dicial remedy. The Court explained why the absence of a 
federal statutory basis for the cause of action was not an ob-
stacle to the award of damages: 
"That damages may be obtained for injuries conse-
quent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by fed-
eral officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition. 
Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordi-
nary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib-
erty. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon 
v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927); Swafford v. 
Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 
U. S. 58 (1900); J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and 
the Supreme Court 28 et seq. (1966); N. Lasson, History 
and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 43 et seq. (1937); Katz, The 
Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and 
the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 
8--33 (1968); cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894); 
Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17 (1884). Of course, 
the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words pro-
vide for its enforcement by an award of money damages 
for the consequences of its violation. But 'it is . . . well 
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a 
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for 
such invasion, federal courts may use any available rem-
edy to make good the wrong done.' Bell v. Hood, 327 
U. S., at 684 (footnote omitted). The present case in-
volves no special factors counselling hesitation in the ab-
sence of affirmative action by Congress. We are not 
dealing with a question of 'federal fiscal policy,' as in 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311 
(1947)." 403 U. S., at 395-396. 
The Court further noted that there was "no explicit congres-
sional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's 
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money 
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damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to 
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress." 
I d., at 397. 
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan also 
thought it clear that the power to authorize damages as a 
remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional right 
had not been placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in 
Congress' hands. Id., at 401-402. Instead, he reasoned, 
the real question presented was not "whether the federal 
courts have the power to afford one type of remedy as op-
posed to the other, but rather to the criteria which should 
govern the exercise of our power." Id., at 406. In resolv-
ing that question he suggested "that the range of policy con-
siderations we may take into account is at least as broad as 
the range of those a legislature would consider with respect 
to an expressed statutory authorization of a traditional rem-
edy." I d., at 407. After weighing the relevant policies he 
agreed with the Court's conclusion that the Government had 
not advanced any substantial policy consideration against 
recognizing a federal cause of action for violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights by federal officials. '""" 
In Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), the petitioner, 
former deputy administrative assistant to a Member of Con-
gress, alleged that she had been discharged because of her 
sex, in violation of her constitutional right to the equal pro-
tection of the laws. We held that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment gave her a federal constitutional right 
to be free from official discrimination and that she had alleged 
a federal cause of action. In reaching the conclusion that an 
award of damages would be an appropriate remedy, we em-
phasized the fact that no other alternative form of judicial re-
lief was available. 13 Not only was the case one in which "it is 
13 "Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see n. 1, 
supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would be unavailing. 
And there are available no other alternative forms of judicial relief. For 
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damages or nothing"; we also were persuaded that the special 
concerns which would ordinarily militate against allowing re-
covery from a legislator were fully reflected in respondent's 
affirmative defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause of 
the Constitution. I d., at 246. We noted the absence of any 
explicit congressional declaration that persons in petitioner's 
position may not recover damages from those responsible for 
their injury. ld., at 246-247. 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), involved a claim 
that a federal prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights had been 
violated. The prisoner's mother brought suit on behalf of 
her son's estate, alleging that federal prison officials were re-
sponsible for his death because they had violated their con-
stitutional duty to provide him with proper medical care after 
he suffered a severe asthmatic attack. Unlike Bivens and 
Davis, the Green case was one in which Congress had pro-
vided a remedy, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, against 
the United States for the alleged wrong. 28 U. S. C. § 2671 
et seq. (1976). As is true in this case, that remedy was not as 
completely effective as a Bivens-type action based directly on 
the Constitution. 
The Court acknowledged that a Bivens action could be de-
feated in two situations, but found that neither was present. 
First, the Court could discern "no special factors counselling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." 
446 U. S., at 18-19, citing Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396, and 
Davis, 442 U. S., at 245. Second, there was no congres-
sional determination foreclosing the damages claim and mak-
ing the Federal Tort Claims Act exclusive. 446 U. S., at 19, 
and n. 5. No statute expressly declared the FTCA remedy 
to be a substitute for a Bivens action; indeed, the legislative 
history of the 1974 amendments to the FTCA "made it crys-
tal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, 
complementary causes of action." ld., at 19-20. 
Davis, as for Bivens, 'it is damages or nothing.' Bivens, supra, at 410 
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).'' 442 U. S., at 245. 
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This much is established by our prior cases. The federal 
courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions con-
fers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a con-
stitutional violation. When Congress provides an alterna-
tive remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by 
statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps 
even by the statutory remedy itself, that the Court's power 
should not be exercised. In the absence of such a congres-
sional directive, the federal courts must make the kind of re-
medial determination that is appropriate for a common-law 
tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special fac-
tors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of 
federal litigation. 
Congress has not resolved the question presented by this 
case, either by expressly denying petitioner the judicial rem-
edy he seeks or by providing him with an equally effective 
substitute. 14 We must therefore consider whether a federal 
employee's attempt to recover damages from his superior for 
violation of his First Amendment rights involves any "special 
factors counselling hesitation." When those words were 
first used in Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396, we illustrated our 
meaning by referring to United States v. Standard Oil Co., 
332 U. S. 301, 311, 316 (1947), and United States v. Gilman, 
347 u. s. 507 (1954). 
In the Standard Oil case the Court had been asked to au-
thorize a new damages remedy for the Government against a 
tortfeasor who had injured a soldier, imposing hospital ex-
penses on the Government and depriving it of his services. 
Although, as Justice Jackson properly noted in dissent, the 
allowance of recovery would not have involved any usurpa-
14 We need not reach the question whether the Constitution itself re-
quires a judicially-fashioned damages remedy in the absence of any other 
remedy to vindicate the underlying right, unless there is an express 
textual command to the contrary. Cf. Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246. 
The existing civil service remedies for a demotion in retaliation for pro- ( \~ -..) \ ) 
tected speech are clearly constitutionally adequate. See pp. r infran.---\... _:_:.___:~_j 
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tion of legislative power, 332 U. S., at 318, the Court never-
theless concluded that Congress as "the custodian of the na-
tional purse" should make the necessary determination of 
federal fiscal policy. 15 The Court refused to create a dam-
ages remedy, which would be "the instrument for determin-
ing and establishing the federal fiscal and regulatory policies 
which the Government's executive arm thinks should prevail 
in a situation not covered by traditionally established liabil-
ities." Id., at 314. 
Similarly, in Gilman, the Court applied the Standard Oil 
rationale to reject the Government's attempt to recover in-
demnity from one of its employees after having been held lia-
ble under the FTCA for the employee's negligence. As the 
Court noted, "The relations between the United States and 
its employees have presented a myriad of problems with 
which the Congress over the years has dealt. . . . Govern-
ment employment gives rise to policy questions of great im-
port, both to the employees and to the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches." 374 U. S., at 509. The decision 
regarding indemnity involved questions of employee disci-
pline and morale, fiscal policy, and the efficiency of the fed-
eral service. Hence, the Court wrote, the reasons for defer-
ring to Congressional policy determinations were even more 
compelling than in Standard Oil. 
16 "Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into law is a proper 
subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours. Con-
gress, not this Court or the other federal courts, is the custodian of the 
national purse. By the same token it is the primary and most often the 
exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend, as we 
have said, securing the treasury or the government against financial losses 
however inflicted, including requiring reimbursement for injuries creating 
them, as well as filling the treasury itself." 332 U. S., at 314-315. 
The Court further noted that the type of harm for which the Executive 
sought judicial redress was not new, and that Congress presumably knew 
of it but had not exercised its undoubted power to authorize a damages 
action. Id., at 31fh316. 
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"Here a complex of relations between federal agencies 
and their staffs is involved. Moreover, the claim now 
asserted, though the product of a law Congress passed, 
is a matter on which Congress has not taken a position. 
It presents questions of policy on which Congress has 
not spoken. The selection of that policy which is most 
advantageous to the whole involves a host of consider-
ations that must be weighed and appraised. That func-
tion is more appropriately for those who write the laws, 
rather than for those who interpret them." I d., at 
511-513. 
The special factors counselling hesitation in the creation of 
a new remedy in Standard Oil and Gilman did not concern 
tbe merits of the particular remedy that was sought. 
Rather, they related to the question of who should decide 
whether such a remedy should be provided. We should 
therefore begin by considering whether there are reasons for 
allowing Congress to prescribe the scope of relief that is 
made available to federal employees whose First Amendment 
rights have been violated by their supervisors. 
II 
Unlike Standard Oil and Gilman, this case concerns a 
claim that a constitutional right has been violated. Never-
theless, just as those cases involved "federal fiscal policy'' 
and the relations between the Government and its employ-
ees, the ultimate question on the merits in this case may ap-
propriately be characterized as one of "federal personnel 
policy." When a federal civil servant is the victim of a retal-
iatory demotion or discharge because he has exercised his 
First Amendment rights, what legal remedies are available 
to him? 
The answer to that question has changed dramatically over 
the years. Originally the answer was entirely a matter of 
Executive discretion. During the era of the patronage 
... , 
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system that prevailed in the federal government prior to the 
enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883, 22 Stat. 403, the fed-
eral employee had no legal protection against political retalia-
tion. Indeed, the exercise of the First Amendment right to 
support a political candidate opposing the party in office 
would routinely have provided an accepted basis for dis-
charge.16 During the past century, however, the job secu-
rity of federal employees has steadily increased. 
In the Pendleton Act Congress created the Civil Service 
Commission and provided for the selection of federal civil ser-
vants on a merit basis by competitive examination. Al-
though the statute did not address the question of removals 
in general, 17 it provided that no employee in the public service 
could be required to contribute to any political fund or fired 
for refusing to do so, and it prohibited officers from attempt-
ing to influence or coerce the political actions of others. 18 
16 The Report of the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment sub-
mitted by Senator Pendleton on May 15, 1882, cont,ained a vivid description 
of the patronage system, reading in part as follows: 
"The fact is confessed by all observers and commended by some that 'to the 
victors belong the spoils;' that with each new administration comes the 
business of distributing patronage among its friends .... [The President] 
is to do what some predecessor of his has left undone, or to undo what oth-
ers before him have done; to put this man up and that man down, as the 
system of political rewards and punishments shall seem to him to demand." 
S. Rep. 576, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1882). 
See generally House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History 
of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign 
Countries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2&-173 (1976). 
17 See S. Rep. No. 576, supra n. 16, at 9; compare H. R. Rep. No. 1826, 
47th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1882) (rejected provisions of House bill permit-
ting removals only for cause). 
18 Section 13 provided, 
"No officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act shall 
discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in manner change the official rank or 
compensation of any other officer or employee, or promise or threaten so to 
do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of 
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Congressional attention to the problem of politically-
motivated removals was again prompted by the issuance of 
Executive Orders by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft that for-
bade federal employees to communicate directly with Con-
gress without the permission of their supervisors. 19 These 
money or other valuable thing for any political purpose." 
Other sections made it unlawful for government employees to solicit po-
litical contributions from, and to give such contributions to, other govern-
ment employees, §§ 11, 14, and to receive any political contributions on 
government premises, § 12. Section 2 required the Civil Service Commis-
sion to promulgate rules providing, inter alia, "that no person in the public 
service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any politi-
cal fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed 
or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so," and also "that no person in 
said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce 
the political action of any person or body. 22 Stat. 404. See 5 U. S. C. 
§ 2302(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); 5 U. S. C. §§ 7321-7323 (1976). 
19 In 1906 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 1142, which 
provided that: 
"All officers and employees of the United States of every description, 
serving in or under any of the executive departments or independent Gov-
ernment establishments, and whether so serving in or out of Washington, 
are hereby forbidden, either directly or indirectly, individually or through 
associations, to solicit an increase of pay or to influence or attempt to influ-
ence in their own interest any other legislation whatever, either before 
Congress or its committees, or in any way save through the heads of the 
departments or independent Government establishments in or under which 
they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the Government service. Theo-
dore Roosevelt." 
President Taft issued another order, Executive Order No. 1514, in 1909: 
"It is hereby ordered that no bureau, office, or division chief, or subordi-
nate in any department of the Government, and no officer of the Army or 
Navy or Marine Corps stationed in Washington, shall apply to either 
House of Congress, or to any committee of either House of Congress, or to 
any Member of Congress, for legislation or for appropriations, or for con-
gressional action of any kind, except with the consent and knowledge of the 
head of the department; nor shall any such person respond to any request 
for information from either House of Congress, or any committee of either 
House of Congress, or any member of Congress, except through or as au-
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"gag orders," enforced by dismissal, were cited by several 
legislators as the reason for enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette 
Act in 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, § 6. 20 That statute provided 
that "no person in the classified Civil Service of the United 
States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as 
will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons 
given in writing, . . . . " 21 Moreover, it explicitly guaranteed 
that the right of civil servants "to furnish information to ei-
ther House of Congress, or to any committee or member 
thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with." 22 As the 
House Report explained, this legislation was intended "to 
protect employees against oppression and in the right of free 
speech and the right to consult their representatives." 23 In 
thorized by the head of his department. William H. Taft." 
48 Cong. Rec. 4513, 5223, 5634, 5635, 10673, 10729-10730 (1912). 
20 See 48 Cong. Rec. 4513 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Gregg) ("[l]t is for the 
purpose of wiping out the existence of this despicable 'gag rule' that this 
provision is inserted. The rule is unjust, unfair, and against the provi-
sions of the Constitution of the United States, which provides for the right 
of appeal and the right of free speech to all its citizens.") A number of the 
bill's proponents asserted that the gag rule violated the First Amendment 
rights of civil servants. See, e. g., id., at 4653 (remarks of Rep. Calder) 
(1912); id., at 4738 (remarks of Rep. Blackmon); id., at 5201 (remarks of 
Rep. Prouty); id., at 5223 (remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy); id., at 5634 
(remarks of Rep. Lloyd); id., at 5637-5638 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); id., at 
10671 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst); id., at 10673 (remarks of Sen. Reed); id., 
at 10793 (remarks of Sen. Smith); id., at 10799 (remarks of Sen. 
LaFollette). 
21 The statute also required notice and reasons and an opportunity for the 
employee to answer the charges in writing with supporting affidavits. 
These requirements had previously been adopted by President McKinley in 
an Executive Order issued in 1897, but they were not judicially enforce-
able. History of Civil Service Merit Systems, supra n. 16, at 202-203. 
22 This provision was accompanied by a more specific guarantee that 
membership in any independent association of postal employees seeking 
improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions, or the presenta-
tion to Congress of any grievance, "shall not constitute or be cause for re-
duction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of 
persons from said service." 
211 H. R. Rep. No. 388, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1912). 
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enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, Congress weighed the 
competing policy considerations and concluded that efficient 
management of government operations did not preclude the 
extension of free speech rights to government employees. 24 
In the ensuing years, repeated consideration of the con-
flicting interests involved in providing job security, protect-
ing the right to speak freely, and maintaining discipline and 
24 Members of the House, which originated § 6, suggested that it would 
improve the efficiency and morale of the civil service. "It will do away 
with the discontent and suspicion which now exists among the employees 
and will restore that confidence which is necessary to get the best results 
from the employees." 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Cal-
der); see id., at 5635 (remarks of Rep. Lloyd). 
The Senate Committee initially took a different position, urging in its re-
port that the relevant language, see id., at 10732 (House version) be omit-
ted entirely: 
"As to the last clause in section 6, it is the view of the committee that all 
citizens have a constitutional right as such to present their grievances to 
Congress or MemberS thereof. But governmental employees occupy a po-
sition relative to the Government different from that of ordinary citizens. 
Upon questions of interest to them as citizens, governmental employees 
have a right to petition Congress direct. A different rule should prevail 
with regard to their presentation of grievances connected with their rela-
tion to the Government as employees. In that respect good discipline and 
the efficiency of the service requires that they present their grievances 
through the proper administrative channels." S. Rep. No. 955, 62d Cong. 
2d Sess. 21 (1912). 
As Sen. Bourne explained, ''it was believed by the committee that to recog-
nize the right of the individual employee to go over the head of his superior 
and go to Members of Congress on matters appertaining to his own particu-
lar grievances, or for his own selfish interest, would be detrimental to the 
service itself; that it would absolutely destroy the discipline necessary for 
good service." 48 Cong. Rec. 10676 (1912). 
This view did not prevail. After extended discussion in floor debate 
concerning the right to organize and the right to present grievances to 
Congress, id., at 10671-10677, 10728-10733, 10792-10804, the committee 
offered and the Senate approved a compromise amendment to the House 
version-guaranteeing both rights at least in part-which was subse-
quently enacted into law. Id., at 10804; 37 Stat. 555. 
. ' 
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efficiency in the federal workforce gave rise to additional leg-
islation, 25 various executive orders, 26 and the promulgation of 
detailed regulations by the Civil Service Commission. 27 Fed-
eral civil servants are now protected by an elaborate, com-
prehensive scheme that encompasses substantive provisions 
forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and procedures-
administrative and judicial-by which improper action may 
be redressed. They apply to a multitude of personnel deci-
sions that are made daily by federal agencies. 28 Constitu-
26 Among the most significant are the Veterans Preference Act of 1944, 
58 Stat. 390 (protecting veterans in federal employment by extending the 
1912 Act's procedural and substantive protections to adverse actions other 
than removals, and adding the right to respond orally and to appeal to the 
Civil Service Commission); the Back Pay Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 354 (extend-
ing the protections against removal contained in the 1912 Act to all employ-
ees who were suspended without pay; permitting back pay awards to cer-
tain categories of employees who were improperly removed or suspended 
and to victims of improper reductions in force); the Back Pay Act of 1966, 
81 Stat. 203 (1967) (extending the right to back pay and lost benefits to 
every employee affected by a personnel action subsequently found to be 
unjustified); and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1134 (shift-
ing adjudicative functions of Civil Service Commission to the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board, modifying administrative appeals procedures, and 
providing new protections for so-called "whistleblowers"). 
211 Exec. Order No. 10988, § 14, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, 556 (1962), and Exec. 
Order No. 11491, § 22, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605, 17614 (1969), printed in note 
following 5 U. S. C. § 7301 (1976), gave all employees in the competitive 
service the right to appeal adverse actions to the Civil Service Commis-
sion, and made the administrative remedy applicable to adverse personnel 
actions other than removal and suspension without pay. 
27 See 5 CFR §§ 752, 772 (1975). 
28 Not all personnel actions are covered by this system. For example, 
there are no provisions for appeal of suspensions for 14 days or less, 5 
U. S. C. § 7503 (Supp. V 1981), suspension and removal from positions 
in certain agencies in the interests of national security, 5 U. S. C. 
§§ 7531, 7532 (1976), and adverse actions against probationary employees, 
5 U. S. C. § 7511 (Supp. V 1981). In addition, certain actions by supervi-
sors against federal employees, such as wiretapping, warrantless searches, 
or uncompensated takings, would not be defined as "personnel actions" 
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tional challenges to agency action, such as the First Amend-
ment claims raised by petitioner, are fully cognizable within 
this system. As the record in this case demonstrates, the 
Government's comprehensive scheme is costly to administer, 
but it provides meaningful remedies for employees who may 
have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments 
about their agencies. 29 
A federal employee in the competitive service may be re-
moved or demoted "only for such cause as will promote the 
efficiency of the service." 30 The regulations applicable at 
the time of petitioner's demotion in 1975,31 which are sub-
stantially similar to those now in effect, required that an 
employee be given 30 days' written notice of a proposed 
discharge, suspension, or demotion, accompanied by the 
agency's reasons and a copy of the charges. The employee 
within the statutory scheme. We need not decide whether constitutional 
damages actions based on such actions are barred. 
211 Petitioner received retroactive reinstatement and $30,000 in back pay. 
An empirical study found that approximately one quarter of the adverse 
actions in the federal civil service were contested. Merrill, Procedures for 
Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 Va. L. Rev. 196, 19S-199 
(1973). In 1970, agency appeals succeeded in 20% of removal cases and 
24% of demotion cases. Before the Civil Service Commission, 47% of 
those employees who appealed demotions and 24% of those who contested 
removal were successful. I d., at 204 n. 35. 
80 Prior to the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, this 
protection was accorded in part by statute, 5 U. S. C. § 7501(a) (1976) (re-
movals and suspensions without pay of non-preference-eligible employees); 
id. § 7512(a) (removals, suspensions without pay, reductions in grade or 
pay, and other adverse actions against preference-eligible employees), and 
in part by Executive Orders, see n. 26, supra, implemented in Civil Serv-
ice Commission regulations, 5 CFR §§ 752.104(a), 752.201 (1975) (adverse 
actions, including reductions in grade or pay, against covered employees, 
including non-preference-eligibles). The 1978 amendments retained the 
general rule, 5 U. S. C. § 7513(a) (Supp. V 1981), and supplemented it by 
specifying certain "prohibited personnel practices." § 2302. 
8
' Various aspects of the regulations discussed in text were added at dif-
ferent times. See generally Merrill, supra n. 29, at 214-218. 
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then had the right to examine all disclosable materials that 
formed the basis of the proposed action, 5 CFR § 752.202(a) 
(1975), the right to answer the charges with a statement and 
supporting affidavits, and the right to make an oral non-
evidentiary presentation to an agency official. § 752.202(b). 32 
The regulations required that the final agency decision be 
made by an official higher in rank than the official who pro-
posed the adverse action, § 752.202(f). The employee was 
entitled to notification in writing stating which of the initial 
reasons had been sustained. Ibid.; 5 U. S. C. § 7501(b)(4) 
(1976). 
The next step was a right to appeal to the Civil Service 
Commission's Federal Employee Appeals Authority. 5 
CFR §§ 752.203, 772.101 (1975). 33 The Appeals Authority 
was required to hold a trial-type hearing at which the em-
ployee could present witnesses, cross-examine the agen-
cy's witnesses, and secure the attendance of agency offi-
cials, §772.307(c),34 and then to render a written decision, 
§ 772.309(a). An adverse decision by the FEAA was judi-
cially reviewable in either federal district court or the Court 
of Claims. 85 In addition, the employee had the right to ask 
82 Under the statute, before and after the 1978 amendments, the agency 
has the discretionary authority to provide an evidentiary hearing. 5 
U. S. C. § 7501(b) (1976); 5 U. S. C. § 7513(c) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR 
§ 752.404(g) (1983). As amended in 1978, the statute gives the employee 
the right to representation by an attorney or other person. 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7513(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR § 752.404(e) (1983). 
33 The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act gave the Commission's adjudicative 
functions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 5 U. S. C. 
§§ 1205, 7543(d), 7701 (Supp. V 1981). 
80 The Commission's regulations did not specify which party carried the 
burdens of production and persuasion. Nevertheless, participants in the 
process and reviewing courts assumed that the burden was on the agency 
to prove that the adverse action was justified. Merrill, supra n. 29, at 
251; Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals and 
Other Adverse Actions, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 178, 192-193 (1972). 
86 Under the law now in effect, the United States Court of Appeals for 
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the Commission's Appeals Review Board to reopen an ad-
verse decision by the FEAA. § 772.310. 
If the employee prevailed in the administrative process or 
upon judicial review, he was entitled to reinstatement with 
retroactive seniority. § 752.402. He also had a right to full 
back pay, including credit for periodic within-grade or step 
increases and general pay raises during the relevant period, 
allowances, differentials, and accumulated leave. § 550.803. 
Congress intended that these remedies would put the em-
ployee "in the same position he would have been in had the 
unjustified or erroneous personnel action not taken place." 86 
Given the history of the development of civil service reme-
dies and the comprehensive nature of the remedies currently 
available, it is clear that the question we confront today is 
· quite different from the typical remedial issue confronted by 
a common-law court. The question is not what remedy the 
court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go un-
redressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that 
has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to 
conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the 
creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional viola-
tion at issue. That question obviously cannot be answered 
simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide com-
plete relief for the plaintiff. The policy judgment should be 
informed by a thorough understanding of the existing regula-
tory structure and the respective costs and benefits that 
would result from the addition of another remedy for viola-
tions of employees' First Amendment rights. 
The costs associated with the review of disciplinary deci-
sions are already significant-not only in monetary terms, 
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB. 
5 U. S. C. § 7703 (Supp. V 1981); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, § 127(a), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (to be codified at 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1295). 
36 S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966). 
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but also in the time and energy of managerial personnel who 
must defend their decisions. The Government argues that 
supervisory personnel are already more hesitant than they 
should be in administering discipline, because the review that 
ensues inevitably makes the performance of their regular du-
ties more difficult. Brief for the United States 37-41. 
Whether or not this assessment is accurate, it is quite proba-
ble that if management personnel face the added risk of per-
sonal liability for decisions that they believe to be a correct 
response to improper criticism of the agency, they would be 
deterred from imposing discipline in future cases. In all 
events, Congress is in a far better position than a court to 
evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between 
federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service. Not 
only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with 
balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employ-
ees, but it also may inform itself through factfinding proce-
dures such as hearings that are not available to the courts. 
Nor is there any reason to discount Congress' ability to 
make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creat-
ing a new remedy for federal employees who have been de-
moted or discharged for expressing controversial views. 
Congress has a special interest in informing itself about the 
efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past 
it has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level govern-
ment employees are a valuable source of information, and 
that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their 
subordinates' freedom of expression. 37 ( ~ 
37 There is a remarkable similarity between comments made in Congress 
in 1912, when the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was passed, and in 1978, when the 
Civil Service Reform Act was enacted. In 1912, Rep. Calder stated, 
"There are always two sides to every question, and surely if any man is 
competent to express an opinion regarding the needs of the postal service it 
is the men who perform the actual work. If anyone is competent to make 
known unsatisfactory working conditions, who, might I ask, is better quali-
fied to lay his proper grievances before Congress than the men who have 
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Thus, we do not decide whether or not it would be good 
policy to permit a federal employee to recover damages from 
a supervisor who has improperly disciplined him for exercis-
ing his First Amendment rights. As we did in Standard Oil, 
we decline "to create a new substantive legal liability without 
legislative aid and as at the common law" 332 U. S., at 302, 
because we are convinced that Congress is in a better posi-
tion to decide whether or not the public interest would be 
served by creating it. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
complaints to make and who suffer from these grievances?" 48 Cong. Rec. 
4653 (1912). In 1978, a Senate Committee Print stated, "Federal employ-
ees are often the source of information about agency operations suppressed 
by their superiors. Since they are much closer to the actual working situa-
tion than top agency officials, they have testified before Congress, spoken 
to reporters, and informed the public. Mid-level employees provide much 
of the information Congress needs to evaluate programs, budgets, and 
overall agency performance." Senate Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs, The Whistle blowers, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (Comm. Print 1978). 
See also H. R. Rep. No. 9~1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 386-387 (1978); S. 
Rep. No. 9~96, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978). 
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81-469 - Bush v. Lucas 
Dear Lewis: 
This is an important case and I therefore 
particularly welcome any comments or suggestions that 
you think appropriate. I think there is merit to 
your first suggestion and would like to accommodate 
it. Because the opinion develops ~rom page 11 on, 
with emphasis first on the judicial history and later 
on the legislative history, I wonder if I might not 
be able to take care of your concern by simply 
inserting a reference to "history" (leaving out the 
word "legislative"). What I suggest is making the 
second sentence in the second paragraph on page 11 
read this way: 
"There is, however, a good deal of history that 
is relevant to the question whether a federal 
employee's attempt to recover damages from his 
superior for violation of his First Amendment 
rights involves any 'special factors counselling 
hesitation.'" 
I will make another language change on page 11: 
delete the word "either" in the first sentence of the 
second paragraph, thus avoiding the inference that 
there were only two ways in which Congress could 
resolve the question. 
I appreciate the force in your suggestion that 
perhaps we should interpret the legislative history 
as going beyond merely "counselling hesitation." I 
really think it better to leave the basic holding as 
it is, however, because it establishes the principle 
that all one needs is enough legislative history to 
counsel hesitation in order to justify the refusal to 
imply a remedy. If we were to go further and 
interpret the legislative history as tantamount to an 
- 2 -
outright rejection of an implied remedy, it might 
suggest that if we have nothing more than factors 
counselling hesitation a remedy should be implied. 
Another reason for not over-emphasizing 
"legislative history" is that the history on which we 
are relying in this case actually occurred long 
before the Bivens case was decided and therefore is 
not exactly comparable to the post-Bivens legislative 
history in Carlson. 
I think your comment on note 28 on page 18 is 
valid. I will revise it to read: 
"Not all personnel actions are covered by 
this system. For example, there are no 
prov1s1ons for appeal of either suspensions for 
14 days or less, 5 u.s.c. §7503 (Supp. V 1981), 
or adverse actions against probationary 
employees, 5 U.S.C. §7511 (Supp. V 1981). In 
addition, certain actions by supervisors against 
federal employees, such as wiretapping, 
warrantless searches, or uncompensated takings, 
would not be defined as 'personnel actions' 
within the statutory scheme." 
These changes are, of course, subject to keeping 






May 27, 1983 
81-469 Bush v. Lucas 
Dear John: 
You have been receiving more than your share of 
communlcations about this case, and I hesitate to a.dd to 
them. You have written a strong and thoughtful opinion that 
I expect to join. 
The change you made in the first paragraph on page 
11 in response to Bill Rehnquist, is helpful on what con-
cerns me primarily. I agree with your sentence (p. 11): 
"When Congress provides an alternative reme-
dy, it may, of course, indicate lts intent by 
statutory language, by clear legislative his-
tory, or perhaps even by the statutory remedy 
itself, that the Court's power should not be 
exercised." 
In the immediately following paragraph, however, you say 
that Congress has not "indicated its intent" either by ex-
press language or by providing an equally effective substi-
tute. You make no reference at this point to "legislative 
history". Rather, you indicate that the answer here turns 
on whether there are "special factors counseling 
hesitation". would it not be desirable, as you do in the 
preceding paragraph, to retain and rely on "legislative his-
tory" as a guide to congressional intent? 
In Part II, your opinion sets forth the history 
extremely well. In Carlson, as you note on p. 10, the Court 
observed that the legislative history "made it crystal clear 
that Congress view[ed] FTCA and Bivens as parallel, comple-
mentary causes of action". I think your presentation of the 
far more elaborate history of the civil service system makes 
it equally crystal clear that Congress intended to create an 






Your opinion relies on this history as constitut-
ing "special factors counseling hesitation". This is cer-
tainly true. But does not this history - that includes the 
elaborate scheme of remedies - go beyond merely "counseling 
hesitation"? I would think it dispositive as to legislative 
intent, though it is not necessary to rely solely on this. 
The fact of federal employment itself is also a factor coun-
seling hesitation. 
One further point: Note 28, p. 18, identifies 
cer~ain personnel actions not covered. Included among 
thes·e are "national security" personnel. The concluding 
sentence in the note states that we nee~ not "decide whether 
constitutional damages actions" would be barred if brought 
by persons not covered. The sentence, though true, is not 
necessary. Experience indicates that sentences like this 
often invite litigation. In view of the British experience 
- that I understand has been more damaging than has been 
reported - it would be intolerable (for. example) for the 
most sensitive intelligence operation to be embroiled for 
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DE~ar John: 
The changes suggested in your letter of May 27 
substantially meet my concerns . 
Lf they are acceptable to your oth~r "ioins", I 















From: Justice Stevens 
Circulated: ________ _ _ 
Recirculated: ---'Mfl.,.,.-'3"----=1:........:'83'-"'---
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-469 
WILLIAM C. BUSH, PETITIONER v. 
WILLIAM R. LUCAS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner asks us to authorize a new nonstatutory dam-
ages remedy for federal employees whose First Amendment 
rights are violated by their superiors. Because such claims 
arise out of an employment relationship that is governed by 
comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving 
meaningful remedies against the United States, we conclude 
that it would be inappropriate for us to supplement that regu-
latory scheme with a new judicial remedy. 
Petitioner Bush is an aerospace engineer employed at the 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, a major facility op-
erated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion in Alabama. Respondent Lucas is the Director of the 
Center. In 1974 the facility was reorganized and petitioner 
was twice reassigned to new positions. He objected to both 
reassignments and sought formal review by the Civil Service 
Commission.' In May and June 1975, while some of his ad-
ministrative appeals were pending, he made a number of 
public statements, including two televised interviews, that 
1 The record indicates that petitioner filed two appeals from the first re-
assignment and three appeals from the second. App. to Pet. for Writ of 
Cert. e-3 to e-4. He asserts that he had previously made unsuccessful at-
tempts within the Center to obtain redress. App. 30. 
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were highly critical of the agency. The news media quoted 
him as saying that he did not have enough meaningful work 
to keep him busy, that his job was "a travesty and worth-
less," and that the taxpayers' money was being spent fraudu-
lently and wastefully at the Center. His statements were 
reported on local television, in the local newspaper, and in a 
national press release that appeared in newspapers in at least 
three other States. 2 
In June 1975 respondent, in response to a reporter's in-
quiry, stated that he had conducted an investigation and 
that petitioner's statements regarding his job had "no basis in 
fact." App. 15. In August 1975 an adverse personnel ac-
tion was initiated to remove petitioner from his position. 
Petitioner was charged with "publicly mak[ing] intemperate 
remarks which were misleading and often false, evidencing a 
malicious attitude towards Management and generating an 
environment of sensationalism demeaning to the Govern-
ment, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
and the personnel of the George C. Marshall Space Flight 
Center, thereby impeding Government efficiency and econ-
omy and adversely affecting public confidence in the Govern-
ment service. " He was also informed that his conduct had 
undermined morale at the Center and caused disharmony and 
disaffection among his fellow employees. 3 Petitioner had 
the opportunity to file a written response and to make an oral 
presentation to agency officials. Respondent then deter-
mined that petitioner's statements were false and misleading 
and that his conduct would justify removal, but that the 
lesser penalty of demotion was appropriate for a "first of-
fense." App. 15. He approved a reduction in grade from 
GS-14 to GS-12, which decreased petitioner's annual salary 
by approximately $9,716. 
2 App. to Pet. for Cert. d-2 to d-3 (memorandum opinion of District 
Court); id., at e-19 (opinion of Federal Employee Appeals Authority). 
• I d. , at f-2 to f-3 , e-19, e-7. 
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Petitioner exercised his right to appeal to the Federal Em-
ployee Appeals Authority. After a three-day public hear-
ing, the Authority upheld some of the charges and concluded 
that the demotion was justified. It specifically determined 
that a number of petitioner's public statements were mislead-
ing and that, for three reasons, they "exceeded the bounds of 
expression protected by the First Amendment." First, peti-
tioner's statements did not stem from public interest, but 
from his desire to have his position abolished so that he could 
take early retirement and go to law school. Second, the 
statements conveyed the erroneous impression that the 
agency was deliberately wasting public funds, thus discredit-
ing the agency and its employees. Third, there was no le-
gitimate public interest to be served by abolishing petition-
er's position. 4 
Two years after the Appeals Authority's decision, peti-
tioner requested the Civil Service Commission's Appeals Re-
view Board to reopen the proceeding. The Board reexam-
ined petitioner's First Amendment claim and, after making a 
detailed review of the record and the applicable authorities, 
applied the balancing test articulated in Pickering v. Board 
of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). On the one hand, it ac-
knowledged the evidence tending to show that petitioner's 
motive might have been personal gain, and the evidence that 
his statements caused some disruption of the agency's day-to-
day routine. On the other hand, it noted that society as well 
as the individual had an interest in free speech, including "a 
right to disclosure of information about how tax dollars are 
spent and about the functioning of government apparatus, an 
interest in the promotion of the efficiency of the government, 
and in the maintenance of an atmosphere of freedom of ex-
pression by the scientists and engineers who are responsible 
'I d., at e-38 to e-39. Petitioner could have obtained judicial review of 
the Authority's determination by filing suit in a federal district court or in 
the U. S. Court of Claims, but did not do so. 
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for the planning and implementation of the nation's space 
program." Because petitioner's statements, though some-
what exaggerated, "were not wholly without truth, they 
properly stimulated public debate." Thus the nature and ex-
tent of proven disruption to the agency's operations did not 
"justify abrogation of the exercise of free speech." 5 The 
Board recommended that petitioner be restored to his former 
position, retroactively to November 30, 1975, and that he re-
ceive back pay. That recommendation was accepted. Peti-
tioner received approximately $30,000 in back pay. 
While his administrative appeal was pending, petitioner 
filed an action against respondent in state court in Alabama 
seeking to recover damages for defamation and violation of 
his constitutional rights. Respondent removed the lawsuit 
to the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Alabama, which granted respondent's motion for summary 
judgment. It held, first, that the defamation clai1!1 could not 
be maintained because, under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 
(1959), respondent was absolutely immune from liability for 
damages for defamation; and second, that petitioner's demo-
tion was not a constitutional deprivation for which a damages 
action could be maintained. 6 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 598 F . 2d 958 (1979). 
We vacated that court's judgment, 446 U. S. 914 (1980), and 
directed that it reconsider the case in the light of our inter-
vening decision in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). 
The Court of Appeals again affirmed the judgment against 
petitioner. It adhered to its previous conclusion "that plain-
tiff had no cause of action for damages under the First 
Amendment for retaliatory demotion in view of the available 
remedies under the Civil Service Commission regulations." 
647 F. 2d 573, 574 (1981). It explained that the relationship 
between the Federal Government and its civil service em-
6 I d. , at f-23 to f-25. 
' Id. , at d-2 to d-17. 
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ployees was a special factor counselling against the judicial 
recognition of a damages remedy under the Constitution in 
this context. 
We assume for purposes of decision that petitioner's First 
Amendment rights were violated by the adverse personnel 
action. 7 We also assume that, as petitioner asserts, civil 
service remedies were not as effective as an individual dam-
ages remedy 8 and did not fully compensate him for the harm 
he suffered. 9 Two further propositions are undisputed. 
Congress has not expressly authorized the damages remedy 
that petitioner asks us to provide. On the other hand, Con-
gress has not expressly precluded the creation of such a rem-
edy by declaring that existing statutes provide the exclusive 
mode of redress. 
Thus, we assume, a federal right has been violated and 
Congress has provided a less than complete remedy for the 
wrong. If we were ~iting on a clean slate, we might an-
swer the question whether to supplement the statutory 
7 Competent decisionmakers may reasonably disagree about the merits 
of petitioner's First Amendment claim. Compare the opinion of the Dis-
trict Court, App. D to Pet. for Writ of Cert., and the opinion of the Atlanta 
Field Office of the Federal Employees Appeal Authority issued on August 
12, 1976, App. E, both rejecting petitioner's claims, with the opinion of the 
Appeals Review Board issued on July 14, 1978, App. F, finding that the 
First Amendment had been violated. This question is not before us. 
8 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 20-23 (1980) (factors making Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act recovery less "effective" than an action under the 
Constitution to recover damages against the individual official). Peti-
tioner contends that, unlike a damages remedy against respondent indi-
vidually, civil service remedies against the Government do not provide 
for punitive damages or a jury trial and do not adequately deter the uncon-
stitutional exercise of authority by supervisors. Brief for Petitioner 
27-29. 
9 His attorney's fees were not paid by the Government, and he claims to 
have suffered uncompensated emotional and dignitary harms. I d., at 
24-26. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not need to decide 
whether such costs could be recovered as compensation in an action 
brought directly under the Constitution. 
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scheme in either of two quite simple ways. We might adopt 
the common-law approach to the judicial recognition of new 
causes of action and hold that it is the province of the judi-
ciary to fashion an adequate remedy for every wrong that can 
be proved in a case over which a court has jurisdiction. 10 Or 
we might start from the premise that federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction whose remedial powers do not 
extend beyond the granting of relief expressly authorized by 
Congress. 11 Under the former approach, petitioner would 
obviously prevail; under the latter, it would be equally clear 
that he would lose. 
Our prior cases, although sometimes emphasizing one ap-
proach and sometimes the other, have unequivocally rejected 
both extremes. They establish our power to grant relief 
that is not expressly authorized by statute, but they also re-
mind us that such power is to be exercised in the light of rele-
vant policy determinations made by the Congress. We 
"therefore first review some of the cases establishing our 
power to remedy violations of the Constitution and then con-
sider the bearing of the existing statutory scheme on the pre-
cise issue presented by this case. 
I 
The federal courts' power to grant relief not expressly au-
thorized by Congress is firmly established. Under 28 
U. S. C. § 1331 (1976), the federal courts have jurisdiction to 
10 In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803), Chief Justice 
Marshall invoked the authority of Blackstone's Commentaries in support of 
this proposition. Blackstone had written, "it is a general and indisputable 
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, 
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded .... [l]t is a settled and 
invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when with-
held, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress. " 3 Com-
mentaries 23, 109. 
11 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 428 
(1971) (Black, J ., dissenting). 
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decide all cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States." This jurisdictional grant pro-
vides not only the authority to decide whether a cause of ac-
tion is stated by a plaintiff's claim that he has been injured by 
a violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 
684 (1946), but also the authority to choose among available 
judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights. 
This Court has fashioned a wide variety of nonstatutory rem-
edies for violations of the Constitution by federal and state 
officials. 12 The cases most relevant to the problem before us 
are those in which the Court has held that the Constitution 
itself supports a private cause of action for damages against 
a federal official. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 
228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). 
In Bivens the plaintiff alleged that federal agents, without 
a warrant or probable cause, had arrested him and searched 
his home in a manner causing him great humiliation, embar-
rassment, and mental suffering. He claimed damages on the 
theory that the alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment 
provided an independent basis for relief. The Court upheld 
the sufficiency of his complaint, rejecting the argument that a 
state tort action in trespass provided the only appropriate ju-
12 See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882) (ejectment action 
against federal officers to enforce Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment); 
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 64-65 (1900) (damages against state officer 
for denying plaintiffs right to vote in federal election); Ex parte Young, 
209 U. S. 123 (1908) (injunctive relief against state official for violation 
of Fourteenth Amendment); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 398 
(1914) (exclusion in federal criminal case of evidence seized in violation of 
Fourth Amendment); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933) 
(award of interest as well as principal in just compensation claim founded 
on the Fifth Amendment); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Edu-
cation, 402 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1971) (school busing to remedy unconstitutional 
racial segregation). See generally Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 
Colum. L. Rev. 1109, 1124-1127 (1969). 
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dicial remedy. The Court explained why the absence of a 
federal statutory basis for the cause of action was not an ob-
stacle to the award of damages: 
"That damages may be obtained for injuries conse-
quent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by fed-
eral officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition. 
Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordi-
nary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib-
erty. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon 
v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927); Swafford v. 
Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 
U. S. 58 (1900); J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and 
the Supreme Court 28 et seq. (1966); N. Lasson, History 
and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution 43 et seq. (1937); Katz, The 
Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and 
the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 
8-33 (1968); cf. West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78 (1894); 
Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17 (1884). Of course, 
the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words pro-
vide for its enforcement by an award of money damages 
for the consequences of its violation. But 'it is ... well 
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a 
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for 
such invasion, federal courts may use any available rem-
edy to make good the wrong done.' Bell v. Hood, 327 
U. S., at 684 (footnote omitted). The present case in-
volves no special factors counselling hesitation in the ab-
sence of affirmative action by Congress. We are not 
dealing with a question of 'federal fiscal policy,' as in 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311 
(1947)." 403 U. S., at 395-396. 
The Court further noted that there was "no explicit congres-
sional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's 
violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money 
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damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to 
another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress." 
Id., at 397. 
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan also 
thought it clear that the power to authorize damages as a 
remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional right 
had not been placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in 
Congress' hands. Id., at 401-402. Instead, he reasoned, 
the real question presented was not "whether the federal 
courts have the power to afford one type of remedy as op-
posed to the other, but rather to the criteria which should 
govern the exercise of our power." /d., at 406. In resolv-
ing that question he suggested "that the range of policy con-
siderations we may take into account is at least as broad as 
the range of those a legislature would consider with respect 
to an expressed statutory authorization of a traditional rem-
edy." I d., at 407. After weighing the relevant policies he 
agreed with the Court's conclusion that the Government had 
not advanced any substantial policy consideration against 
recognizing a federal cause of action for violation of Fourth 
Amendment rights by federal officials. 
In Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), the petitioner, 
former deputy administrative assistant to a Member of Con-
gress, alleged that she had been discharged because of her 
sex, in violation of her constitutional right to the equal pro-
tection of the laws. We held that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment gave her a federal constitutional right 
to be free from official discrimination and that she had alleged 
a federal cause of action. In reaching the conclusion that an 
award of damages would be an appropriate remedy, we em-
phasized the fact that no other alternative form of judicial re-
lief was available. 13 Not only was the case one in which "it is 
13 "Moreover, since respondent is no longer a Congressman, see n. 1, 
supra, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would be unavailing. 
And there are available no other alternative forms of judicial relief. For 
81-469---0PINION 
10 BUSH v. LUCAS 
damages or nothing"; we also were persuaded that the special 
concerns which would ordinarily militate against allowing re-
covery from a legislator were fully reflected in respondent's 
affirmative defense based on the Speech or Debate Clause of 
the Constitution. I d., at 246. We noted the absence of any 
explicit congressional declaration that persons in petitioner's 
position may not recover damages from those responsible for 
their injury. Id., at 24&-247. 
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), involved a claim 
that a federal prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights had been 
violated. The prisoner's mother brought suit on behalf of 
her son's estate, alleging that federal prison officials were re-
sponsible for his death because they had violated their con-
stitutional duty to provide him with proper medical care after 
he suffered a severe asthmatic attack. Unlike Bivens and 
Davis, the Green case was one in which Congress had pro-
vided a remedy, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, against 
the United States for the alleged wrong. 28 U. S. C. § 2671 
et seq. (1976). As is true in this case, that remedy was not as 
completely effective as a Bivens-type action based directly on 
the Constitution. 
The Court acknowledged that a Bivens action could be de-
feated in two situations, but found that neither was present. 
First, the Court could discern "no special factors counselling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." 
446 U. S., at 18-19, citing Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396, and 
Davis, 442 U. S., at 245. Second, there was no congres-
sional determination foreclosing the damages claim and mak-
ing the Federal Tort Claims Act exclusive. 446 U. S., at 19, 
and n. 5. No statute expressly declared the FTCA remedy 
to be a substitute for a Bivens action; indeed, the legislative 
history of the 1974 amendments to the FTCA "made it crys-
tal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, 
complementary causes of action." Id., at 19-20. 
Davis, as for Bivens, 'it is damages or nothing.' Bivens, supra, at 410 
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).'' 442 U. S., at 245. 
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This much is established by our prior cases. The federal 
courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions con-
fers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a con-
stitutional violation. When Congress provides an alterna-
tive remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by 
statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps 
even by the statutory remedy itself, that the Court's power 
should not be exercised. In the absence of such a congres-
sional directive, the federal courts must make the kind of re-
medial determination that is appropriate for a common-law 
tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special fac-
tors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of 
federal litigation. 
Congress has not resolved the question presented by this 
case by expressly denying petitioner the judicial remedy he 
seeks or by providing him with an equally effective substi-
tute.14 There is, however, a good deal of history that is rele-
vant to the question whether a federal employee's attempt to 
recover damages from his superior for violation of his First 
Amendment rights involves any "special factors counselling 
hesitation." When those words were first used in Bivens, 
403 U. S., at 396, we illustrated our meaning by referring to 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 311, 316 
(1947), and United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 (1954). 
In the Standard Oil case the Court had been asked to au-
thorize a new damages remedy for the Government against a 
tortfeasor who had injured a soldier, imposing hospital ex-
penses on the Government and depriving it of his services. 
Although, as Justice Jackson properly noted in dissent, the 
allowance of recovery would not have involved any usurpa-
14 We need not reach the question whether the Constitution itself re-
quires a judicially-fashioned damages remedy in the absence of any other 
remedy to vindicate the underlying right, unless there is an express 
textual command to the contrary. Cf. Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246. 
The existing civil service remedies for a demotion in retaliation for pro-
tected speech are clearly constitutionally adequate. See pp. 19-21, infra. 
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tion of legislative power, 332 U. S., at 318, the Court never-
theless concluded that Congress as "the custodian of the na-
tional purse" should make the necessary determination of 
federal fiscal policy. 16 The Court refused to create a dam-
ages remedy, which would be "the instrument for determin-
ing and establishing the federal fiscal and regulatory policies 
which the Government's executive arm thinks should prevail 
in a situation not covered by traditionally established liabil-
ities." I d., at 314. 
Similarly, in Gilman, the Court applied the Standard Oil 
rationale to reject the Government's attempt to recover in-
demnity from one of its employees after having been held lia-
ble under the FTCA for the employee's negligence. As the 
Court noted, "The relations between the United States and 
its employees have presented a myriad of problems with 
which the Congress over the years has dealt. . . . Govern-
ment employment gives rise to policy questions of great im-
port, both to the employees and to the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches." 374 U. S., at 509. The decision 
regarding indemnity involved questions of employee disci-
pline and morale, fiscal policy, and the efficiency of the fed-
eral service. Hence, the Court wrote, the reasons for defer-
ring to Congressional policy determinations were even more 
compelling than in Standard Oil. 
15 "Whatever the merits of the policy, its conversion into Jaw is a proper 
subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours. Con-
gress, not this Court or the other federal courts, is the custodian of the 
national purse. By the same token it is the primary and most often the 
exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend, as we 
have said, securing the treasury or the government against financial losses 
however inflicted, including requiring reimbursement for injuries creating 
them, as well as filling the treasury itself." 332 U. S., at 314-315. 
The Court further noted that the type of harm for which the Executive 
sought judicial redress was not new, and that Congress presumably knew 
of it but had not exercised its undoubted power to authorize a damages 
action. Id., at 315-316. 
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"Here a complex of relations between federal agencies 
and their staffs is involved. Moreover, the claim now 
asserted, though the product of a law Congress passed, 
is a matter on which Congress has not taken a position. 
It presents questions of policy on which Congress has 
not spoken. The selection of that policy which is most 
advantageous to the whole involves a host of consider-
ations that must be weighed and appraised. That nmc-
tion is more appropriately for those who write the laws, 
rather than for those who interpret them." I d., at 
511-513. 
The special factors counselling hesitation in the creation of 
a new remedy in Standard Oil and Gilman did not concern 
the merits of the particular remedy that was sought. 
Rather, they related to the question of who should decide 
whether such a remedy should be provided. We should 
therefore begin by considering whether there are reasons for 
allowing Congress to prescribe the scope of relief that is 
made available to federal employees whose First Amendment 
rights have been violated by their supervisors. 
II 
Unlike Standard Oil and Gilman, this case concerns a 
claim that a constitutional right has been violated. Never-
theless, just as those cases involved "federal fiscal policy" 
and the relations between the Government and its employ-
ees, the ultimate question on the merits in this case may ap-
propriately be characterized as one of "federal personnel 
policy." When a federal civil servant is the victim of a retal-
iatory demotion or discharge because he has exercised his 
First Amendment rights, what legal remedies are available 
to him? 
The answer to that question has changed dramatically over 
the years. Originally the answer was entirely a matter of 
Executive discretion. During the era of the patronage 
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system that prevailed in the federal government prior to the 
enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883, 22 Stat. 403, the fed-
eral employee had no legal protection against political retalia-
tion. Indeed, the exercise of the First Amendment right to 
support a political candidate opposing the party in office 
would routinely have provided an accepted basis for dis-
charge.16 During the past century, however, the job secu-
rity of federal employees has steadily increased. 
In the Pendleton Act Congress created the Civil Service 
Commission and provided for the selection of federal civil ser-
vants on a merit basis by competitive examination. Al-
though the statute did not address the question of removals 
in general, 17 it provided that no employee in the public service 
could be required to contribute to any political fund or fired 
for refusing to do so, and it prohibited officers from attempt-
ing to influence or coerce the political actions of others. 18 
16 The Report of the Committee on Civil Service and Retrenchment sub-
mitted by Senator Pendleton on May 15, 1882, contained a vivid description 
of the patronage system, reading in part as follows: 
"The fact is confessed by all observers and commended by some that 'to the 
victors belong the spoils;' that with each new administration comes the 
business of distributing patronage among its friends .... [The President] 
is to do what some predecessor of his has left undone, or to undo what oth-
ers before him have done; to put this man up and that man down, as the 
system of political rewards and punishments shall seem to him to demand." 
S. Rep. 576, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1882). 
See generally House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, History 
of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign 
Countries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-173 (1976). 
17 SeeS. Rep. No. 576, supra n. 16, at 9; compare H. R. Rep. No. 1826, 
47th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1882) (rejected provisions of House bill permit-
ting removals only for cause). 
18 Section 13 provided, 
"No officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act shall 
discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in manner change the official rank or 
compensation of any other officer or employee, or promise or threaten so to 
do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of 
81-469---0PINION 
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Congressional attention to the problem of politically-
motivated removals was again prompted by the issuance of 
Executive Orders by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft that for-
bade federal employees to communicate directly with Con-
gress without the permission of their supervisors. 19 These 
money or other valuable thing for any political purpose." 
Other sections made it unlawful for government employees to solicit po-
litical contributions from, and to give such contributions to, other govern-
ment employees, §§ 11, 14, and to receive any political contributions on 
government premises, § 12. Section 2 required the Civil Service Commis-
sion to promulgate rules providing, inter alia, "that no person in the public 
service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any politi-
cal fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not be removed 
or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so," and also "that no person in 
said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce 
the political action of any person or body. 22 Stat. 404. See 5 U. S. C. 
§ 2302(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); 5 U. S. C. §§ 7321-7323 (1976). 
19 In 1906 President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 1142, which 
provided that: 
"All officers and employees of the United States of every description, 
serving in or under any of the executive departments or independent Gov-
ernment establishments, and whether so serving in or out of Washington, 
are hereby forbidden, either directly or indirectly, individually or through 
associations, to solicit an increase of pay or to influence or attempt to influ-
ence in their own interest any other legislation whatever, either before 
Congress or its committees, or in any way save through the heads of the 
departments or independent Government establishments in or under which 
they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the Government service. Theo-
dore Roosevelt." 
President Taft issued another order, Executive Order No. 1514, in 1909: 
"It is hereby ordered that no bureau, office, or division chief, or subordi-
nate in any department of the Government, and no officer of the Army or 
Navy or Marine Corps stationed in Washington, shall apply to either 
House of Congress, or to any committee of either House of Congress, or to 
any Member of Congress, for legislation or for appropriations, or for con-
gressional action of any kind, except with the consent and knowledge of the 
head of the department; nor shall any such person respond to any request 
for information from either House of Congress, or any committee of either 
House of Congress, or any member of Congress, except through or as au-
81~69--0PINION 
16 BUSH v. LUCAS 
"gag orders," enforced by dismissal, were cited by several 
legislators as the reason for enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette 
Act in 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, § 6. 20 That statute provided 
that "no person in the classified Civil Service of the United 
States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as 
will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons 
given in writing, .... " 21 Moreover, it explicitly guaranteed 
that the right of civil servants "to furnish information to ei-
ther House of Congress, or to any committee or member 
thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with." 22 As the 
House Report explained, this legislation was intended "to 
protect employees against oppression and in the right of free 
speech and the right to consult their representatives." 23 In 
thorized by the head of his department. William H. Taft." 
48 Cong. Rec. 4513, 5223, 5634, 5635, 10673, 10729-10730 (1912). 
20 See 48 Cong. Rec. 4513 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Gregg) ("[l]t is for the 
purpose of wiping out the existence of this despicable 'gag rule' that this 
provision is inserted. The rule is unjust, unfair, and against the provi-
sions of the Constitution of the United States, which provides for the right 
of appeal and the right of free speech to all its citizens.") A number of the 
bill's proponents asserted that the gag rule violated the First Amendment 
rights of civil servants. See, e. g., id., at 4653 (remarks of Rep. Calder) 
(1912); id., at 4738 (remarks of Rep. Blackmon); id., at 5201 (remarks of 
Rep. Prouty); id., at 5223 (remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy); id., at 5634 
(remarks of Rep. Lloyd); id., at 5637-5638 (remarks of Rep. Wilson); id., at 
10671 (remarks of Sen. Ashurst); id., at 10673 (remarks of Sen. Reed); id., 
at 10793 (remarks of Sen. Smith); id., at 10799 (remarks of Sen. 
LaFollette). 
21 The statute also required notice and reasons and an opportunity for the 
employee to answer the charges in writing with supporting affidavits. 
These requirements had previously been adopted by President McKinley in 
an Executive Order issued in 1897, but they were not judicially enforce-
able. History of Civil Service Merit Systems, supra n. 16, at 202-203. 
22 This provision was accompanied by a more specific guarantee that 
membership in any independent association of postal employees seeking 
improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions, or the presenta-
tion to Congress of any grievance, "shall not constitute or be cause for re-
duction in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of 
persons from said service." 
23 H. R. Rep. No. 388, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1912). 
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enacting the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, Congress weighed the 
competing policy considerations and concluded that efficient 
management of government operations did not preclude the 
extension of free speech rights to government employees. 24 
In the ensuing years, repeated consideration of the con-
flicting interests involved in providing job security, protect-
ing the right to speak freely, and maintaining discipline and 
24 Members of the House, which originated § 6, suggested that it would 
improve the efficiency and morale of the civil service. "It will do away 
with the discontent and suspicion which now exists among the employees 
and will restore that confidence which is necessary to get the best results 
from the employees." 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Cal-
der); see id., at 5635 (remarks of Rep. Lloyd). 
The Senate Committee initially took a different position, urging in its re-
port that the relevant language, see id., at 10732 (House version) be omit-
ted entirely: 
"As to the last clause in section 6, it is the view of the committee that all 
citizens have a constitutional right as such to present their grievances to 
Congress or Members thereof. But governmental employees occupy a po-
sition relative to the Government different from that of ordinary citizens. 
Upon questions of interest to them as citizens, governmental employees 
have a right to petition Congress direct. A different rule should prevail 
with regard to their presentation of grievances connected with their rela-
tion to the Government as employees. In that respect good discipline and 
the efficiency of the service requires that they present their grievances 
through the proper administrative channels." S. Rep. No. 955, 62d Cong. 
2d Sess. 21 (1912). 
As Sen. Bourne explained, "it was believed by the committee that to recog-
nize the right of the individual employee to go over the head of his superior 
and go to Members of Congress on matters appertaining to his own particu-
lar grievances, or for his own selfish interest, would be detrimental to the 
service itself; that it would absolutely destroy the discipline necessary for 
good service." 48 Cong. Rec. 10676 (1912). 
This view did not prevail. After extended discussion in floor debate 
concerning the right to organize and the right to present grievances to 
Congress, id., at 10671-10677, 1072S-10733, 10792-10804, the committee 
offered and the Senate approved a compromise amendment to the House 
version-guaranteeing both rights at least in part-which was subse-
quently enacted into law. ld., at 10804; 37 Stat. 555. 
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efficiency in the federal workforce gave rise to additional leg-
islation, 25 various executive orders, 26 and the promulgation of 
detailed regulations by the Civil Service Commission. 'l:l Fed-
eral civil servants are now protected by an elaborate, com-
prehensive scheme that encompasses substantive provisions 
forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and procedures-
administrative and judicial-by which improper action may 
be redressed. They apply to a multitude of personnel deci-
sions that are made daily by federal agencies. 28 Constitu-
25 Among the most significant are the Veterans Preference Act of 1944, 
58 Stat. 390 (protecting veterans in federal employment by extending the 
1912 Act's procedural and substantive protections to adverse actions other 
than removals, and adding the right to respond orally and to appeal to the 
Civil Service Commission); the Back Pay Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 354 (extend-
ing the protections against removal contained in the 1912 Act to all employ-
ees who were suspended without pay; permitting back pay awards to cer-
tain categories of employees who were improperly removed or suspended 
and to victims of improper reductions in force); the Back Pay Act of 1966, 
81 Stat. 203 (1967) (extending the right to back pay and lost benefits to 
every employee affected by a personnel action subsequently found to be 
unjustified); and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1134 (shift-
ing adjudicative functions of Civil Service Commission to the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board, modifying administrative appeals procedures, and 
providing new protections for so-called "whistleblowers"). 
26 Exec. Order No. 10988, § 14, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, 556 (1962), and Exec. 
Order No. 11491, §22, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605, 17614 (1969), printed in note 
following 5 U. S. C. § 7301 (1976), gave all employees in the competitive 
service the right to appeal adverse actions to the Civil Service Commis-
sion, and made the administrative remedy applicable to adverse personnel 
actions other than removal and suspension without pay. 
27 See 5 CFR §§ 752, 772 (1975). 
211 Not all personnel actions are covered by this system. For example, 
there are no provisions for appeal of either suspensions for 14 days or less, 
5 U. S. C. § 7503 (Supp. V 1981), or adverse actions against probationary 
employees, § 7511. In addition, certain actions by supervisors against fed-
eral employees, such as wiretapping, warrantless searches, or uncompen-
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tional challenges to agency action, such as the First Amend-
ment claims raised by petitioner, are fully cognizable within 
this system. As the record in this case demonstrates, the 
Government's comprehensive scheme is costly to administer, 
but it provides meaningful remedies for employees who may 
have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments 
about their agencies. 29 
A federal employee in the competitive service may be re-
moved or demoted "only for such cause as will promote the 
efficiency of the service." 30 The regulations applicable at 
the time of petitioner's demotion in 1975,31 which are sub-
stantially similar to those now in effect, required that an 
employee be given 30 days' written notice of a proposed 
discharge, suspension, or demotion, accompanied by the 
agency's reasons and a copy of the charges. The employee 
then had the right to examine all disclosable materials that 
29 Petitioner received retroactive reinstatement and $30,000 in back pay. 
An empirical study found that approximately one quarter of the adverse 
actions in the federal civil service were contested. Merrill, Procedures for 
Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 Va. L. Rev. 196, 198-199 
(1973). In 1970, agency appeals succeeded in 20% of removal cases and 
24% of demotion cases. Before the Civil Service Commission, 47% of 
those employees who appealed demotions and 24% of those who contested 
removal were successful. Id., at 204 n. 35. 
30 Prior to the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, this 
protection was accorded in part by statute, 5 U. S. C. § 7501(a) (1976) (re-
movals and suspensions without pay of non-preference-eligible employees); 
id. § 7512(a) (removals, suspensions without pay, reductions in grade or 
pay, and other adverse actions against preference-eligible employees), and 
in part by Executive Orders, see n. 26, supra, implemented in Civil Serv-
ice Commission regulations, 5 CFR §§ 752.104(a), 752.201 (1975) (adverse 
actions, including reductions in grade or pay, against covered employees, 
including non-preference-eligibles). The 1978 amendments retained the 
general rule, 5 U. S. C. § 7513(a) (Supp. V 1981), and supplemented it by 
specifying certain "prohibited personnel practices." § 2302. 
31 Various aspects of the regulations discussed in text were added at dif-
ferent times. See generally Merrill, supra n. 29, at 214-218 . 
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formed the basis of the proposed action, 5 CFR § 752.202(a) 
(1975), the right to answer the charges with a statement and 
supporting affidavits, and the right to make an oral non-
evidentiary presentation to an agency official. § 752.202(b). 32 
The regulations required that the final agency decision be 
made by an official higher in rank than the official who pro-
posed the adverse action, § 752.202(f). The employee was 
entitled to notification in writing stating which of the initial 
reasons had been sustained. Ibid. 5 U. S. C. § 7501(b)(4) 
(1976). 
The next step was a right to appeal to the Civil Service 
Commission's Federal Employee Appeals Authority. 5 
CFR §§ 752.203, 772.101 (1975). 33 The Appeals Authority 
was required to hold a trial-type hearing at which the em-
ployee could present witnesses, cross-examine the agen-
cy's witnesses, and secure the attendance of agency offi-
cials, § 772.307(c),34 and then to render a written decision, 
§ 772.309(a). An adverse decision by the FEAA was judi-
cially reviewable in either federal district court or the Court 
of Claims. 35 In addition, the employee had the right to ask 
32 Under the statute, before and after the 1978 amendments, the agency 
has the discretionary authority to provide an evidentiary hearing. 5 
U. S. C. § 7501(b) (1976); 5 U. S. C. § 7513(c) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR 
§ 752.404(g) (1983). As amended in 1978, the statute gives the employee 
the right to representation by an attorney or other person. 5 U. S. C. 
§ 7513(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981); see 5 CFR § 752.404(e) (1983). 
33 The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act gave the Commission's adjudicative 
functions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). 5 U. S. C. 
§§ 1205, 7543(d), 7701 (Supp. V 1981). 
34 The Commission's regulations did not specify which party carried the 
burdens of production and persuasion. Nevertheless, participants in the 
process and reviewing courts assumed that the burden was on the agency 
to prove that the adverse action was justified. Merrill, supra n. 29, at 
251; Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals and 
Other Adverse Actions, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 178, 192-193 (1972). 
35 Under the law now in effect, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB. 
81-469-0PINION 
BUSH v. LUCAS 21 
the Commission's Appeals Review Board to reopen an ad-
verse decision by the FEAA. § 772.310. 
If the employee prevailed in the administrative process or 
upon judicial review, he was entitled to reinstatement with 
retroactive seniority. § 752.402. He also had a right to full 
back pay, including credit for periodic within-grade or step 
increases and general pay raises during the relevant period, 
allowances, differentials, and accumulated leave. § 550.803. 
Congress intended that these remedies would put the em-
ployee "in the same position he would have been in had the 
unjustified or erroneous personnel action not taken place." 36 
Given the history of the development of civil service reme-
dies and the comprehensive nature of the remedies currently 
available, it is clear that the question we confront today is 
quite different from the typical remedial issue confronted by 
a common-law court. The question is not what remedy the 
court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go un-
redressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that 
has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to 
conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the 
creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional viola-
tion at issue. That question obviously cannot be answered 
simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide com-
plete relief for the plaintiff. The policy judgment should be 
informed by a thorough understanding of the existing regula-
tory structure and the respective costs and benefits that 
would result from the addition of another remedy for viola-
tions of employees' First Amendment rights. 
The costs associated with the review of disciplinary deci-
sions are already significant-not only in monetary terms, 
but also in the time and energy of managerial personnel who 
5 U. S. C. § 7703 (Supp. V 1981); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, § 127(a), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (to be codified at 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1295). 
36 S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966). 
81-469-0PINION 
22 BUSH v. LUCAS 
must defend their decisions. The Government argues that 
supervisory personnel are already more hesitant than they 
should be in administering discipline, because the review that 
ensues inevitably makes the performance of their regular du-
ties more difficult. Brief for the United States 37-41. 
Whether or not this assessment is accurate, it is quite proba-
ble that if management personnel face the added risk of per-
sonal liability for decisions that they believe to be a correct 
response to improper criticism of the agency, they would be 
deterred from imposing discipline in future cases. In all 
events, Congress is in a far better position than a court to 
evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between 
federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service. Not 
only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with 
balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employ-
ees, but it also may inform itself through factfinding proce-
dures such as hearings that are not available to the courts. 
Nor is there any reason to discount Congress' ability to 
make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creat-
ing a new remedy for federal employees who have been de-
moted or discharged for expressing controversial views. 
Congress has a special interest in informing itself about the 
efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past 
it has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level govern-
ment employees are a valuable source of information, and 
that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their 
subordinates' freedom of expression. 37 
37 There is a remarkable similarity between comments made in Congress 
in 1912, when the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was passed, and in 1978, when the 
Civil Service Reform Act was enacted. In 1912, Rep. Calder stated, 
"There are always two sides to every question, and surely if any man is 
competent to express an opinion regarding the needs of the postal service it 
is the men who perform the actual work. If anyone is competent to make 
known unsatisfactory working conditions, who, might I ask, is better quali-
fied to lay his proper grievances before Congress than the men who have 
complaints to make and who suffer from these grievances?" 48 Cong. Rec. 
81-46~0PINION 
BUSH v. LUCAS 23 
Thus, we do not decide whether or not it would be good 
policy to permit a federal employee to recover damages from 
a supervisor who has improperly disciplined him for exercis-
ing his First Amendment rights. As we did in Standard Oil , 
we decline "to create a new substantive legal liability without 
legislative aid and as at the common law" 332 U. S., at 302, 
because we are convinced that Congress is in a better posi-
tion to decide whether or not the public interest would be 
served by creating it. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
4653 (1912). In 1978, a Senate Committee Print stated, "Federal employ-
ees are often the source of information about agency operations suppressed 
by their superiors. Since they are much closer to the actual working situa-
tion than top agency officials, they have testified before Congress, spoken 
to reporters, and informed the public. Mid-level employees provide much 
of the information Congress needs to evaluate programs, budgets, and 
overall agency performance." Senate Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs, The Whistle blowers, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (Comm. Print 1978). 
See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 386-387 (1978); S. 
Rep. No. 95-696, 95th Cong:, 2d Sess. 8 (1978). 
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.;§upttmt ~om:t of tip~ ~1®~ ~taf.cg 
2!tctllltutgfctt. ~. ~· 2llgtJ!.~ 
Re: No. 81-469 - Bush v. Lucas 
Dear John: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
June 9, 1983 
'" 
: 
81-469 Bush v. Lucas (Jim) 
JPS for the Court 
1st draft 5/18/83 
2nd draft 5/24/83 
3rd draft 5/31/83 
Joined by CJ, WJB, BRW, HAB, LFP, WHR, SOC 
TM concurring opinion 
1st draft 6/2/83 
2nd draft 6/8/83 
3rd draft 6/9/83 
Joined by HAB 
